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ABSTRACT
PUBLIC POLICY AND YOUTH SUBSTANCE USE
By
BO FENG
August 2018

Committee Chair:
Major Department:

Dr. Charles Courtemanche
Public Management and Policy

Youth substance use remains a centerpiece of public policy. This dissertation
characterizes the impacts of three policy decisions – legalizing marijuana, restricting access to
electronic cigarettes, and raising cigarette excise taxes – on youth smoking, drinking, and
marijuana use.
Chapter 1 uses Google search data to study the effects of marijuana legalization on
youth marijuana use, by examining how information seeking on marijuana changed after states
legalizing medical and recreational marijuana. Prior studies using survey data have found
limited effects of medical marijuana legalization on youth marijuana use, and I show that this
empirical regularity is also reflected in Google searches. In particular, legalizing medical
marijuana influenced searches related only to news and not use or potential health concerns of
use, but legalizing recreational marijuana boosted searches in all three dimensions. Linking
state-level search data on marijuana use to the Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS), I find that
stronger interest in use predicts higher levels of youth marijuana consumption, suggesting that
recreational marijuana legalization may lead to increased marijuana use among adolescents.

Chapter 2 examines the effects of e-cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age laws on youth
cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and marijuana use. Using data from the national and
state YRBS, we find that the laws increased youth smoking participation, approximately half of
which could be attributed to smoking initiation. Limiting youth access to e-cigarettes has
unintendedly made smoking more attractive, but we find little policy effects on youth drinking,
binge drinking, and marijuana use.
Chapter 3 presents a new perspective on the disappearance of tax deterrent effects on
teenage smoking in recent years. Motivated by the logic of price elasticity, we present
evidence that the success of taxation can explain such disappearance because the ever-rising
tax rates have nudged a significant portion of youth to quit smoking. Once the market is left
only with those who are price insensitive, further tax hikes will naturally be less effective.
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INTRODUCTION
Youth substance use is a public health problem; left unattended, it has devastating
impacts on the life expectancy and quality of life of all adolescents. The Surgeon General warns
that total economic costs due to tobacco use alone have exceeded $289 billion annually; had
we continue on the current path of tobacco use, 5.6 million of today’s Americans youth will die
prematurely as a result of smoking (US Department of Health Human Services 2014). Less
mentioned, youth substance use also generates intergenerational and fiscal externalities. Such
externalities include the harms to other citizens from drug-related crimes as well as increased
government spending on health consequences of substance misuse. With little doubt,
addressing youth substance use remains a centerpiece for policy discussion.
Cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana are among the most widely used substances by
adolescents. This dissertation examines the impacts of three policy decisions – legalizing
marijuana, restricting access to electronic cigarettes, and raising cigarette excise taxes – on
youth smoking, drinking, and marijuana use.
The first chapter focuses on medical marijuana legalization, which allows qualified
patients to use marijuana for therapeutic reasons, and recreational marijuana legalization,
which allows adults to smoke marijuana freely. In this chapter, I take an innovative approach to
estimating the policy effects on behavior, which travels through the lens of information search.
Understanding the direct effects of policy on marijuana use is of importance and understanding
the policy effects on information search deserves equal attention. This can be seen from both a
theoretical and pragmatic perspective. Theoretically, information serves as a key input into an
agent’s choice ranking (Stigler 1961), and information enters his experience utility directly.
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Pragmatically, a more conventional policy evaluation needs information from survey data and
the lag of dissemination of these data has restricted its application. As the debate on
recreational marijuana legalization becomes increasingly contentious in many other states,
policymakers may need the best available information to facilitate their decisions when a full
evaluation of the effect of legalization on marijuana use cannot yet be implemented. From an
alternative standpoint, lack of information or imperfect information is a type of market failure
that warrants policy intervention. Therefore, if legalizing marijuana were to trigger active
information search and the salience of information influences choice and decision (Chetty,
Looney, and Kroft 2009, Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011, Hoxby and Turner 2013), then
policymakers may want to ensure that rigorous and accurate information about marijuana is
made available and highly ranked in online searches. This seems particularly valuable because
youth may not be able to distinguish reliable sources of information from the numerous
unreliable, sometimes misleading, sources that are widely available on the Internet community.
Using data from Google Trends, I design search terms that capture people’s interest in
marijuana in three dimensions: marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects of use. I
show that an empirical regularity identified in prior research where legalizing medical marijuana
has had little effects on youth marijuana use is also reflected in Google searches. In particular,
legalizing medical marijuana influences searches related only to news but not use or the health
effects of use while legalizing recreational marijuana boosts interest in all three dimensions. To
examine the interaction of information seeking and behavior change, I link state-level searches
to micro-level data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) and show that interest in
marijuana use, on which recreational marijuana legalization exerted a strong influence, is
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positively associated with youth marijuana use. Additionally, interest in the potential health
consequences of marijuana use, on which recreational marijuana legalization has a modest
impact, associates negatively with youth marijuana consumption. I discuss the magnitude of
these effects and the implications of my empirical results for public policy.
The second chapter turns to e-cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age (MLSA) laws which
attempt to reduce youth e-cigarette use. Existing empirical studies on the impacts of MLSA
laws on youth smoking have reached a mixed conclusion, with one study showing that the laws
decreased youth smoking while the other two showing that the laws led to unintended
consequences of higher cigarette use, thereby posing an interesting puzzle. The debate about
the economic relationship between conventional and electronic cigarettes has proved to be
contentious, with the recent report from the Institute of Medicine calling for more evidence to
draw that line definitively (National Academies of Sciences and Medicine 2018). Thus, pinning
down whether e-cigarettes complements or substitutes for smoking is policy relevant.
Using micro-level data from the national and state YRBS, we present evidence that
MLSA laws increased youth smoking participation by about 1 percentage points, approximately
half of which can be attributed to smoking initiation. We subject this finding to a battery of
checks, including the synthetic control design, and continue to find that youth substitute
conventional cigarettes when their access to e-cigarettes is restricted.
The addictive nature of nicotine (which both conventional and electronic cigarettes
contain) motivates the chapter’s second objective, and that is to examine the intertemporal
relationship between the laws and youth smoking. Specifically, we ask whether a policy that
makes smoking more attractive today makes future smoking also more likely. In this part of the
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analysis, we focus on youth who have aged out of the laws but were exposed to the MLSA
restrictions while underage. We find little evidence that higher cigarette smoking persists
beyond the point at which youth are able to purchase e-cigarettes legally.
In light of the high co-occurrence of cross substance use among adolescents, the
chapter’s final objective is to document the policy’s third-order effects on youth alcohol
consumption and marijuana use. Much as our finding on the intertemporal relationship, we
show little effect of the laws on youth drinking, binge drinking, and marijuana use.
The third chapter provides a new perspective on the recent finding that cigarette excise
taxes no longer reduce teenage smoking. Building on the logic of price elasticity, we argue that
the success of taxation over the years can explain the disappearance of such tax deterrent
effects, because higher taxes have nudged a significant portion of youth to quit smoking. When
the market is left only with those who are price insensitive, further tax hikes will be naturally
less effective. Empirically, we present two pieces of evidence to support this hypothesis. First,
using a semiparametric model, controlling for state and year fixed effects as well as observable
characteristics, we show that the impacts of tax on smoking follow a diminishing pattern, with
recent tax hikes in most states falling on the flat portion of the curve. Second, when we restrict
attention to states in which the baseline tax rates are low, we continue to find that higher taxes
reduce youth smoking even in the period during which the recent study find no effects on
average. Both results are robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends, which
contrasts with the sensitivity observed in previous research using more restrictive functional
forms.
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CHAPTER 1
Marijuana Legalization and Interest in Marijuana: Evidence from Google Trends
1. Introduction
On November 5, 1996, California passed Proposition 215, making it the first state in the
nation where marijuana became an option for patients with debilitating conditions. Since then,
twenty-eight states and D.C have introduced medical marijuana legalization, offering protection
to patients who can use marijuana under the recommendation of a physician. Paralleling state
efforts in medical marijuana legalization, public support for legalizing marijuana has risen.
National polls show that over 90% of American voters favor states allowing marijuana use for
medical purposes (Quinnipiac University Polling Institute 2017) and 60% of U.S adults favor
recreational marijuana legalization (Swift 2016). In 2012, Washington became the first state
where adults aged 21 or above can use marijuana legally. Six states and D.C have since passed
bills legalizing recreational marijuana use. By August 2017, twenty-nine states have had some
form of medical marijuana legalization and nine states have liberated marijuana use for the
adult population. In contrast, the use, sale, and possession of marijuana remain illegal under
the federal law.
With the legalization of marijuana at the forefront of current local, state, and federal
policy discussions, considerable debate is focused on determining the likely effects legalization
has when marijuana use no longer subjects individuals to criminal prosecution. Proponents
argue that legalization can bring positive economic impacts in addition to the already
materialized health benefits, such as an entirely new tax revenue stream and increased
employment opportunities (Zezima Katie 2018). On the other hand, opponents caution that
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legalization may lead to drug misuse and abuse, violence and crimes, and other downstream
health consequences (Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings 2015, Gerstein Josh 2017). This
debate, which is often framed as a question about whether the benefits outweigh its costs, has
proved to be contentious, with compelling arguments in favor of either side of the viewpoints
in different settings. Marijuana use has been shown to affect adolescent brain development
and academic performance as well as create various health problems such as breathing
difficulty and increased risk for mental health challenges (National Institute on Drug Abuse
2016). Policymakers therefore pay close attention to the possibility that legalization of
recreational marijuana may send the wrong message to youth, increasing their marijuana
consumption.
This study takes an innovative approach to analyzing this question – through the lens of
information search – since a more conventional program evaluation strategy is not yet feasible
due to the recent nature of most recreational marijuana legalization laws combined with lags in
the dissemination of the survey datasets that measure substance use. Additionally,
understanding the effect of marijuana legalization policies on information-seeking behavior is
important in its own right. This can be seen from both a theoretical and pragmatic perspective.
Theoretically, information serves as a key input into an agent’s choice ranking (Stigler 1961),
and information enters his experience utility directly. Pragmatically, lack of information or
imperfect information is a type of market failure that warrants policy intervention. Hence, if
legalizing marijuana were to trigger active information seeking and the salience of information
influences choice and decision (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009, Gallagher and Muehlegger
2011, Hoxby and Turner 2013), then policymakers may want to ensure that rigorous and
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accurate information about marijuana is made available and highly ranked in online searches.
This type of nudge will be particularly valuable because youth may not be able to distinguish
reliable sources of information from the many unreliable, sometimes misleading, sources that
are widely available on the Internet community.
Using data from Google Trends, I design search terms to capture people’s interest in
marijuana in three dimensions: marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects
associated with marijuana consumption. I first show that the empirical regularity identified in
prior research where legalizing medical marijuana has had little effects on youth marijuana use
is also reflected in Google searches. In particular, legalizing medical marijuana influences
searches related to news only while legalizing recreational marijuana boosts interest in all three
dimensions. Using a covariate-adjusted event-study design, I present evidence that galvanized
search interest in these dimensions is not transitory, especially after the recreational law
became fully effective. To examine the interaction of information seeking and behavior change,
I link state-level searches to micro-level data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) and
show that interest in marijuana use, on which recreational marijuana legalization exerts a
strong influence, is positively associated with youth marijuana use. Additionally, interest in the
potential health consequences of marijuana use, on which recreational marijuana legalization
has a modest impact, associates negatively with youth marijuana consumption.
With public support for recreational marijuana legalization continuing to rise,
policymakers may need to make decisions even when a full evaluation of the effect of
legalization on marijuana use cannot yet be implemented. Viewed from this perspective, this
study can be of particular interest in two respects. First, using data that are updated in nearly
7

real-time, the study can offer feedback regarding the consequence of legalization to
policymakers which is time sensitive. Second, the study can provide insights into the likely
effects recreational laws on youth marijuana use could have through the lens of information
search that reveals an individual’s wants and needs. Logically, building the link between
information seeking and behavior change is the other piece needed for answering the policyrelevant question of whether legalizing recreational marijuana increases youth marijuana
consumption if legalization casually influences information search. In the section that follows, I
nest my empirical analysis within a hypothesis that needs and wants revealed through
information search can affect near-term choice and decision (Benz and Meier 2008,
Mullainathan and Thaler 2001, Thaler 2015, Wilcox 2007, Wilson 2000, Jansen, Booth, and
Smith 2009). The empirical results below suggest that making accurate information about
marijuana, particularly its associated health consequences, salient and available to youth may
mitigate unintended consequences of the policy. This policy intervention will be of practical
value even if youth who use marijuana are more likely to search for marijuana-related
information.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Marijuana Legalization and Youth Marijuana Use
Studies regarding the impacts of medical marijuana legalization (MML) on marijuana use
have reached mixed conclusions, with findings varying due to sample heterogeneity, target
population, and research designs. But for youth and adolescents, the typical finding is that
MML had little to no effects on their marijuana consumption. For example, Anderson, Hansen,
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and Rees (2015) draw on multiple datasets and approach the question from two perspectives:
how does MML affect youth marijuana use directly and how does it affect the number of
hospitalization induced by irresponsible marijuana use. From both angles, the authors find the
policy effects to be little or nil. Subsequent studies using updated datasets or new data sources
have reached a similar conclusion (Choo et al. 2014, Johnson, Hodgkin, and Harris 2017).
Critics of the above research have argued that drawing policy inferences without
recognizing the heterogeneity in MML can be misleading because, unlike the typical policy
change, MML has several sub-provisions whose enactments are state-specific. Since the above
studies modeled MML's impacts on youth behavior change without factoring in this
heterogeneity, it may be that the estimated MML effects are a composite of multi-dimensional
changes. Of this concern, Pacula et al. (2015) decompose MML into four separate indicator
variables, each of which captures a unique dimension of the policy. In general, MML consists of
four dimensions: overall legislation, patient registry, home cultivation, and legal dispensaries.
Overall legislation indicates if the state passed MML at the general level. Patient registry
requires patients who intend to use marijuana for medical purposes to register with a state or
local authority. Home cultivation grants patients and caregivers to grow cannabis plants at
home. And legal dispensaries provide protection for retail dispensaries to operate within the
state. The key insight from Pacula et al. is that states that enacted MML have discretion in
incorporating other sub-provisions, naturally creating a spectrum of variation even within the
state. The authors show that, once policy heterogeneity is permitted, youth respond positively
in marijuana use to the enactment of legal dispensaries. Because MML policies are not
homogenous across states and states that first enacted MML are working to add the remaining
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sub-provisions, the authors conclude that taking into account such policy heterogeneity is very
much needed to advance the knowledge of MML and the relation between MML and youth
marijuana consumption.
In contrary to the many MML treatment effect estimates, few studies have looked at
the workings of recreational marijuana legalization (RML), mainly because RML policies are
enacted more recently and sufficient survey data are not yet available. Using Colorado and
Washington to build a case study, Anderson and Rees (2014) discuss the potential behavior
changes in marijuana use had states legalize marijuana for recreational purposes.1 The main
takeaways are that legalizing recreational marijuana is likely to drive up marijuana use, with a
more pronounced behavioral response among adults than youth. The policy could also
decrease alcohol consumption and reduce the incidence of drunk driving, thus possibly yielding
a public health gain.2
Using an early release of survey data for 2010-2015 from the Monitoring the Future
(MTF) project, Cerda et al. (2016) find that high school students’ marijuana use increased in
states that passed RML, and their perception of its harmfulness declined – though the patterns
are only statistically significant in Washington and not in Colorado. Their result suggests that
legalizing recreational marijuana use may lead to more youth using marijuana, but it is unclear

Washington and Colorado are the first two states that implemented RML. See Table 1.1 for the exact time of the
law’s enactment and implementation.
2 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, traffic fatalities are the leading cause of death
among Americans ages 5–34 and many of the traffic accidents involve drunk driving. Studies looking at the
marijuana-alcohol relationship have suggested substitutability. For instance, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013)
find that the number of recorded traffic fatalities are negatively associated with MML, with a stronger relation if
the accident involves drinking. Dinardo and Lemieux (2001) find that raising the minimum legal drinking age
reduces alcohol consumption but increases marijuana use.
1
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to what extent this conclusion would generalize as only two states (Washington and Colorado)
had RML enacted over the study period.
Empirical analyses of the impacts marijuana legalization could have on youth marijuana
use suggest little to no MML effects on youth marijuana use but a likely positive RML effects on
youth marijuana consumption. In the next subsection, I shift lens to studies that focus on the
connection between information seeking and behavior change. These studies share a common
theme: utilizing search data to predict the near-term behavior change.

2.2 The Interaction of Information Seeking and Behavior Change and The Application of
Search Data
Obtaining a timelier forecast of economic conditions has motivated the use of search
data from modern search engines. Among all the search engines in the market, Google Trends
has enjoyed a boom in popularity thanks to its real-time update of information, public
accessibility, and the company’s overall success. In a series of studies, Choi and Varian (2009a,
2009b) present a high-level overview of the advantage Google search data enjoy that many
survey-based indicators do not in areas such as predicting near-term unemployment claims,
travel planning, automobile sales, and consumer confidence. Similar comparisons between
search data and survey-based metrics have also appeared in Vosen and Schmidt (2011), where
the authors show that empirical models, once equipped with Google search data, yield higher
precision both in the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction. At a more aggregate level, van
Veldhuizen and colleagues (2016) apply Google search data to analyze housing market
transactions and find that search activities for “mortgage” in prior months are highly
11

informative of transactions occurred contemporaneously, consistent with the hypothesis that
needs and wants can affect choice and decision. Motivated by this empirical finding,
subsequent studies have developed real-time indices of mortgage default risks using Google
search data, with evidence that search data based indices have high and robust correlations
with housing returns, mortgage delinquency, and subprime credit default swaps (Chauvet,
Gabriel, and Lutz 2016). To-date, arguably the most recognized study that brings Google search
data into public attention is produced by a team of Google scientists. Using millions of search
terms recorded in Google database, Ginsberg et al. (2009) apply machine learning strategy and
demonstrate that search data can predict seasonal influenza epidemics with high precision.
Monitoring the dynamics of influenza epidemics has been the core focus of CDC’s surveillance
system, and when government data have a typical two-week reporting lags, the real-time
update of search information in Google makes Ginsberg’s finding even more striking.
Using search data to build forecasting models and compare predictive accuracy across
metrics has been the theme of the preceding work. Parallel to this literature, a different camp
of research program has developed to characterize the applicability of search data for questions
that used to be analyzed with survey method approach. Two of these studies stand out, and
both have focused on the impacts of macroeconomic conditions on mental health through the
lens of information search. Using unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment rates
as proxies for economic conditions, Tefft (2011) shows that the deterioration of economy
triggers spikes in Google searches for “depression” and “anxiety,” consistent with the surveybased finding that mental health exhibits a procyclical variation (Ruhm 2005). The second study
linking unemployment rates with alcoholism-related searches also finds a positive association,
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confirming that a worsened economy leads to higher levels of stress (Frijters et al. 2013).
Subsequent work has revisited the economy-mental health relationship using variants of search
terms to those employed in Tefft and Frijters et al., and the broader lesson revealed there is
that findings based on survey data can be replicated using Google searches.
The third wave of research examines the interaction of information-seeking and
behavior change, pairing search data with survey or administrative information. For instance,
Metcalfe and colleagues (2011) link Google searches for “cervical cancer” and “smear test”
around a TV star’s death due to cervical cancer with administrative data on cervical screenings.
They find that “historical” searches correlate highly with the current level of screening take-ups.
Consistent with this, McDonnell et al. (2012) match searches related to “swine flu” with patient
emergency department visits and also find a robust intertemporal correlation. Using the H1N1
influenza pandemic as an exogenous health shock, Aguero and Beleche (2017) show that spiked
Google searches for hand sanitizers are closely related to the observed behavior of hand
washing. All these studies have found support to the hypothesis that needs and wants revealed
through information search can lead to subsequent choice and decision, and yet none of them
speaks to the direct impact of searching on behavior change. When selection effects and
simultaneity biases are prevalent in this type of research, it is perhaps unsurprising that
identifying the causal effect of searching will be difficult. The estimated relationship derived
here are therefore suggestive and pinning down the Google search effects remains an active
research agenda going forward.
This study will contribute to the growing medical marijuana literature and the budding
recreational marijuana literature by offering the first empirical analysis on how legalization
13

affects online information seeking about marijuana. It also provides a primitive analysis of the
direct linkage between information search and youth marijuana consumption. The following
section will now turn to Google search data.

3. Google Trends Data and Policy Controls
I use data from Google Trends (GT) from January 1, 2004 to August 31, 2017 to study
the impacts of marijuana legalization on different dimensions of search interest in marijuana. 3
GT is a public data warehouse that offers real-time snapshots of what people searched for on
Google. The earliest time point GT has data is January 1, 2004, and my sample ends on August
31, 2017 as the state-level policy variables are only available at the time of writing.
For privacy concerns, GT does not report data in raw counts but provides researchers
with the relative search volume – a normalized search index with a maximum of 100 and a
minimum of 0. GT calculates this search index in two steps. First, the share of search queries
(raw search counts) for the requested terms in a given region and time point to the total search
queries in that region over my entire study period is calculated. Second, the share at every
time point is then normalized relative to the overall maximum over the entire period examined
(Choi and Varian 2009a). Since the relative search volume ranges from 0 to 100, one can think
of it as measuring the likelihood that a random user will search for a particular phrase at a given
geo-region and time point over the entire period I study.4

https://trends.google.com/trends/
Since my estimation sample is at the state by year by month level, one can think of “region” as “state” and “a
given time” as “a given year-month.”
3
4
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Following Tefft (2011) and Frijters et al. (2013), I extract data for 50 states and D.C over
the period specified above, with the analysis sample measured at the state by year by month
level. Although GT stores any phrases in the database as long as users searched for those
phrases on Google, for confidentiality reasons, researchers will not be able to collect search
indices for phrases that are too specific.5
I design three sets of search terms to capture different dimensions of people’s interest
in marijuana. The first set – “Marijuana,” “Pot,” “Weed,” and “Cannabis” – reflects interest in
marijuana in general, such as marijuana policy and marijuana news. The second set – “Smoke
Marijuana,” “Smoke Pot,” “Smoke Weed,” “Smoke Cannabis,” “Marijuana Dispensary,”
“Marijuana Bong,” “Marijuana Pipes,” “Marijuana Vaporizer,” and “Marijuana Edible” – reflects
interest in marijuana use or where to obtain marijuana. And the third set – “Marijuana,” “Pot,”
“Weed,” and “Cannabis” within the category of “Health conditions” in GT – reflects interest in
the health effects of marijuana use.6 Because terms in the first set are broadly defined, their
search indices are likely to reflect some interests captured by terms in the second and third set.
Having overlap is thus unavoidable, but a closer look at what people were also searching for

Google sets an undisclosed threshold that prevents GT from reporting data to researchers if search queries
associated with the phrase do not exceed that threshold. For instance, GT does not report any search indices
associated with “where can I get marijuana,” though it is very likely that users searched for them on Google. This
feature undoubtedly limits the term composition I can use.
6 Constrained by the threshold Google imposes, I finalize the search terms as follows. To start the process, I enter
the root term “marijuana” into the GT system and exploit GT’s built-in function that produces a list of ten most
related terms to “marijuana.” I then use each of the suggested terms as an alternative root term and prime GT to
create another list of ten most related terms. This process is iterated till 100 different and intuitively relevant
terms are collected. Next, I rely on Twitter’s Relevance function, which indicates a given term’s “age” of hitting its
100th tweet, to build a rank. A term has a higher rank if its time of reaching the 100th tweet is shorter.
Consultation with experts comes at last. Not surprisingly, implementing this process has produced a large set of
terms, most of which failed to pass the minimum threshold and are no longer pursued. Another chunk of terms,
once entered into GT along with “marijuana,” produce approximately zero search indices because the popularity of
“marijuana” dwarfs that of other terms and search indices are calculated in a relative term.
5
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when Googling the first set suggests a minimum level of cross-references. In particular, GT has
a built-in function that feeds back a list of most related terms to what was searched at the
moment. Exploiting this feature, I find that phrases such as “medical marijuana,” “legal
marijuana,” “legal weed,” and “marijuana laws” are also popular when terms in the first set are
in the GT system. “Smoking weed” is also one of many on the list, but it appears only once
while the more broadly defined terms like the above accounts for the rest.7 Hence, terms in my
first set are largely reflective of interest in marijuana at a broader level.
Upon collecting search data associated with each term, I create the average monthly
search indices running through all terms within a given set (Choi and Varian 2012) and apply a
standard normal transformation to the newly created search data over the time period
examined (Tefft, 2011). Therefore, search indices have a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one in my analysis sample.
The key independent variables of interest – medical marijuana legalization (MML) and
recreational marijuana legalization (RML) – come from various sources: Marijuana Policy
Project, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy’s Marijuana Resource Center, NORML, as well as Choi et al. (2016). By August 2017,
twenty-nine states including D.C have legalized marijuana for therapeutic reasons and nine,
including D.C, have legalized marijuana use for adults 21 or older. Table 1.1 shows the
legalization status in each state, separated by the time the legalization was enacted versus fully

This exercise uses U.S. as the region of interest. The period remains from January 1, 2004 to August 31, 2017.
When I use specific states as the region of interest, the top ten most related terms are similar in general but may
contain terms that are geographic specific. For instance, in California, terms like “marijuana card,” “medical
marijuana card,” and “marijuana dispensary” are more common and more likely to appear on the top of the list.
7
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implemented. With a regular legislative process, it is perhaps unsurprising that most states set
different dates for the legalization to fully materialize. The data structure (state-year-month)
allows me to single out the differential impacts legalization has on search interest, and I create
two indicator variables with the first tracking the legalization’s enactment and the second its
implementation/enforcement.8 States may also choose to enforce the law in the same month
when the law is signed; if so, I only use the second indicator in the model. For states that have
not yet set up MML or RML by the end of my study period, both indicators will have value zero.9
Motivated by results in Pacula et al. (2015), I create separate indicator variables for each of
MML’s sub-provision and include them simultaneously in the model.10
Following Tefft (2011), I include in the model the following state-level covariates to
account for confounders such as labor market conditions, economic fluctuations, and the basic
state demographic make-ups that may correlate with political decisions in marijuana
legalization as well as Internet searches. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rates, labor
force participation, and state non-institutionalized population come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Unemployment insurance (UI) claims, continued UI claims, covered employment (in
1,000s), and the insured unemployment rate come from the Employment and Training
Administration in the U.S. Department of Labor. State demographic composition such as the

I set the first indicator equal to one for each full month during and following the enactment but prior to the
implementation/enforcement. The second indicator is coded analogously except that it “switches on and remains
on” after the legalization becomes fully effective.
9 A few states (California and Hawaii) have implemented MML before 2004 – the sample’s starting period – and I
retain them in the analysis.
10 In the past, scholars have concerned about the multicollinearity issue when all sub-provisions of MML are
included in the model. This issue can be particularly relevant when the analysis sample is at the state-by-year level
and has a relatively short time window. However, the sample used in this study obviates this concern because it
covers a longer period of time and is at the state-by-year-by-month level.
8
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population distribution by race/ethnicity and by education levels are drawn from the Current
Population Survey Basic Monthly Data.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for search indices and state-level covariates, with
their means calibrated as follows. First, I split the sample into two groups: the group in which
states have either no marijuana legalization or only MML implemented by the end of study
period, and the other where states have either no marijuana legalization or have RML further
implemented.11 Within each group, I classify states into two camps with one that has the
legalization (reform states) and the other that does not (non-reform states). I then assign each
non-reform state a randomly selected pseudo-reform date, drawing from the true distribution
of legalization dates among the reform states.12 Lastly, I normalize different legalization dates
to the same time point (𝑡=0) and separate the entire sample window into a pre-policy and a
post-policy period. The left panel of Table 1.2 focuses on states with only MML and the right
panel on states that further implemented RML. The top three rows suggest that search
interests in all dimensions increased after the passage of either legalization (both for the reform
and non-reform states), which is consistent with the upward trend of public support in
marijuana in general. While interest has risen over time, the change in magnitudes differs
between the reform and non-reform states. For example, interest in marijuana news,
marijuana use, and the health effects of use have increased in a greater proportion in the
reform states than those in the non-reform states after enacting RML (right panel). While it

States that later implemented RML have also established MML in the past. Therefore, it is impossible to split the
sample into one that implemented MML only and the other that implemented RML only.
12 There is a different way to pick the pseudo-legalization date and that is to randomly pick one from the stack of
all actual legalization dates from the reform states. It is reassuring that the two methods yield similar results.
Nevertheless, I report results from the first method as it is more general.
11
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appears to suggest that RML has a positive impact on search interest, many confounders have
not been accounted for in such simple mean comparisons. In the following analysis, I assess
whether differential changes in interest are due to time change that occurs naturally or if RML
played any role in it. Rows 4-12 report the mean comparisons of the labor market and
economic conditions between the reform and non-reform states as well as comparisons withingroup before and after the policy change. Overall, state-level characteristics are comparable
except in a few cases. Rows 13-17 report the mean comparisons of state demographic makeups. While the reform states have a higher fraction of Hispanics, the differences in other
dimensions are not statistically significant. Overall, the balance of the state-level covariates is
not so perfect, which speaks to the importance of controlling them in the regression model.
Figure 1.1 and 1.2, mirroring the setup of Table 1.2, illustrate the change of search
interest in each dimension over the entire study period. Figure 1.1 focuses on states that only
implemented MML and Figure 1.2 focuses on states where RML is further adopted. In both
figures, Panel A presents the trends of search interest in marijuana news, Panel B the trends of
search interest in marijuana use, and Panel C the trends of search interest in the health effects
of use. Trends in each figure are constructed by averaging search indices within a given interest
domain at a given month relative to the month legalization was enacted, demarcated by the
dashed vertical line. Negative values on the horizontal axis thus denote time periods leading up
to the policy change and positive values denote time periods afterward. At the broadest level,
search interest in marijuana news (Panel A) has been trending upward over time, mirroring
what is reported in Table 1.2. But jumps in interest around the legalization’s enactment are
only apparent in the reform states, whereas interest trends smoothly across this threshold in
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the non-reform states. Similar spikes occur in the context of RML and they appear more
pronounced.
Contrary to the rising interest in marijuana news, search interest in marijuana use (Panel
B of both figures) exhibits different trending patterns. In the context of MML, for example,
search interest in the reform states, though rises before the policy change, appears to be
stabilized afterward; but, in the non-reform states, interest continues to rise throughout. In the
context of RML, trending patterns are reversed. And that is, search interest in the reform states
keeps rising while interest in the non-reform states plateaus after RML is enacted. Moreover,
there are virtually no spikes in interest in marijuana use at the time MML is enacted, and the
degree of bunching is noticeably smaller at the time of RML’s enactment. In light of these
trending patterns, one may think MML and RML have little to no impacts on search interest in
marijuana use. I think this conclusion may not be correct if interest in use takes time to build
while interest in news is more spontaneous. For instance, the surge in interest in marijuana
news could be largely driven by media reports and news and press, but interest in use requires
contributions from potential users. When we return to Panel B and examine it more closely,
the curved and upward growth of interest in marijuana use appears to suggest that developing
such interest indeed takes time and interest in marijuana use is only manifested later. From a
different angle, if the added mass of interest (several months later) is primarily driven by
established users who are interested in exploring new sources of getting marijuana despite
already having a reliable channel, then the pattern of interest growth is consistent with the
model of rational information acquisition, as re-optimizing in response to a policy change on
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the extensive margin has first-order (large) benefits, whereas re-optimizing on the intensive
margin only reaps second-order (small) benefits (Chetty 2012).
Lastly, Panel C presents search interest in the health effects of marijuana use. A few
things worthy of note. First, in the context of MML, search interest in the reform states
appears to drift downward after MML’s enactment, but interest in the non-reform states
continues to rise across this threshold. Because searches in this dimension are likely to contain
interest both in the positive aspects of marijuana use, such as pain relieving, and in the adverse
health effects of use, such as lung cancer, the decreased searches in reform states hint that
these search indices are not capturing people’s interest in the health benefits of marijuana use.
Second, in the context of RML, interest in the reform states, though not exhibiting immediate
increases at the time of the policy change, experiences clear jumps a few years later. Along
with what we have seen in the context of MML, search indices in Panel C appear to largely
reflect people’s interest in the adverse effects of marijuana use. The slowly warmed up interest
is nevertheless consistent with Panel B and perhaps suggest that accumulated interest in
marijuana use is a key correlate of interest in learning the health consequences of marijuana
use.
The preceding graphs have hinted a positive legalization effect on different search
interest. But many confounding factors have yet to be adjusted, making the graphical evidence
at most suggestive. Moreover, the not so perfect parallel trends in the pre-policy periods raise
the concern that detecting the true legalization effects under a stylized framework – differencein-differences (DD) – may not be appropriate. This motivates a series of robustness checks that
I employ, ranging from specifications that include state-specific time trends to a fully-adjusted
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event-study research design and synthetic control method. Reassuringly, all these models yield
policy impacts that are economically and statistically comparable. The following section will
formalize these models and assess the legalization effects on search interest in marijuana news,
marijuana use, and the health effects of use.

4. Empirical Models Assessing the Impacts of Marijuana Legalization on Search Interests and
Results
Following the standard approach used in the prior literature, I estimate the impacts of
MML and RML on search interest in marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects of
use using OLS regression, which takes the form
(1)

𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑚 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝑏2 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
+ 𝑏3 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑚 +
𝑠𝑡𝑚
𝑏4 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛤𝑿𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑚 ,
𝑠𝑡𝑚

where 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑚 measures interest in a given domain in state s, year t, and month m.
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 are indicator variables, with the former capturing periods since the
policy’s enactment but before its implementation/enforcement and the latter capturing periods
when the policy becomes de facto legal. Analogously, RML’s enactment and enforcement are
captured in 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 and 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 . 𝐗 is a vector including the state-level covariates listed
in Table 1.2, and state fixed effects accounting for the time-invariant state-specific
heterogeneity, and year-month fixed effects accounting for the macro-level shocks that are
common to all states are denoted by 𝛄s and 𝛌tm respectively. The identification assumption
needed for consistency of legalization effects in (1) is similar to that under the stylized DD
model, and that is search interests would have evolved identically in the reform and non22

reform states absent the legalization. Such parallelism is, however, not perfect (Figure 1.1 and
1.2). To address this concern, my first attempt is to include the state-specific linear (𝜸𝒔 ・𝒕𝒎)
or quadratic (𝜸𝒔 ・𝒕𝒎 + 𝜸𝒔 ・𝒕𝒎𝟐 ) time trends, building on the assumption that the
unobserved factors, which are state-specific, trend linearly or quadratically over the study
period. If it were true, 𝑏1 to 𝑏4 can be causally interpreted as the impacts of legalization on
search interest. If it does not hold, however, I will rely on evidence drawn from other variants
of specification in (1) to detect the impacts of MML and RML. 13 Throughout my analysis, I
cluster standard errors by state to allow for serial correlation and common error components
within states over time (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004, Cameron and Miller 2015).

4.1 Results from the Baseline Model and Models with State-specific Trends
Table 1.3 presents estimates of legalization effects on search interest in three
dimensions. Panel A, B, and C consider these interests in turn, and regression models under
column (1) – (3) vary on the basis of what conditional independence assumption I use to draw
policy inferences. State-level covariates listed in Table 1.2 are included throughout my analysis.
I begin in Panel A by estimating the reduced form effects of marijuana legalization on
search interest in marijuana news. This interest is captured by terms that are broadly defined,
as discussed in the Data section, and regressions are estimated with one observation per state
per year per month. Overall, the estimates of legalization effects are comparable across three
model specifications. The fact that magnitudes do not dramatically decrease after

13

Since these state-specific factors are unobservable, this assumption is innately untestable.
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incorporating the state-specific trends lends support to the assumption that MML and RML are
orthogonal to the unobserved factors that influence interest in marijuana news.14 Enacting
MML is found to raise search interest by about 43 to 46 percent (p < 0.01), while the influence
of its implementation/enforcement is much smaller and is only marginally significant. In
contrary to the behavioral response in searches to MML, enacting RML has a modest impact on
interest in marijuana news, but its enforcement has made a substantial difference, driving up
interest by more than 100 percent (p < 0.01). The elevated interest in marijuana news upon
MML’s enactment may be expected if signing the law attracts public attention and media
coverage. The increase may also emerge from the need to schedule doctor appointments
among those who see marijuana as alternative treatments but erroneously think that it can be
immediately prescribed (Bradford and Bradford 2016). Should the second mechanism be at
work, the differential behavioral responses to MML versus RML may be reconciled. To test this
hypothesis, I collect search data from the term “doctor appointment,” substitute it as the
outcome variable and re-run the analysis.15 Table 1.7 suggests that there is little evidence that
MML increases interest in this dimension. Not only the point estimates are small in
magnitudes, they are also estimated with precision. In light of such findings, it may be that
heightened interest in marijuana news is largely driven by media and press whose short
attention span explains why increased interest diminishes even after MML becomes fully
implemented.

The point estimates associated with the “Medical Marijuana Legalization enforced” indicator, however, fluctuate
quite a bit as the underlying model changes. But two of them are statistically indistinguishable from zero and one
is significant only at the 10% level.
15 More specific terms such as “schedule a doctor appointment” and “schedule an appointment with doctor”
cannot be used because their search queries do not pass Google’s threshold discussed above.
14
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Panel B reports the estimated impacts of marijuana legalization on search interest in
marijuana use. Interest in this dimension is measured by terms reflecting motives that are
consumption-driven (terms such as “smoke marijuana” and “marijuana shops”), and the
estimates are generated using regressions analogous to that above, with one observation per
state per year per month. Panel B shows a different pattern of legalization effects overall, and,
in particular, the influence of MML, either at the time of its enactment or enforcement, is quite
limited.16 On the contrary, legalization effects appear to originate solely from RML’s
enforcement, which raises interest in marijuana use or where to obtain marijuana by 70 to 80
percent. Similar to that in Panel A, signing RML into law exerts a moderate impact, irrespective
of whether state-specific trends are included. The small degree of behavioral response in
online searches to RML’s enactment seems at odds with what we observe in Figure 1.2 where
interest in use does experience jumps. Two reasons may explain this difference. First, search
interest plotted in Figure 1.2 is not covariates adjusted whereas regression estimates are. And
second, the bunching at RML’s enactment (Figure 1.2) need not be inconsistent with estimates
from the reduced form models, which are weighted averages. If spiked interest in use is only
transient, the specification in (1) may not be able to detect. This discrepancy motivates an
alternative empirical strategy, which examines the dynamic RML effects on search interest in
the context of an event-study design, as shown in the next subsection.
Panel C quantifies the impacts of marijuana legalization on interest in the health effects
of marijuana use. Interest in this domain is measured using a similar set of terms to that in

Although in the model specification that includes state-specific linear and quadratic time trends the estimated
impact of MML’s enforcement is negative and significant (p < 0.05), the weight of the evidence suggests that
MML’s impact on search interest in marijuana use is minimal.
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Panel A but collected within the “Health conditions” category in GT. As above, regressions are
estimated with one observation per state per year per month. Overall, MML has a negligible
impact on people’s interest in the health effects of marijuana use but enforcing RML has
increased such interest by about 50 to 60 percent. 17 Based on figures above, we think that
search indices here are largely reflecting people’s interest in the health consequences of
marijuana use. And the limited effects MML exerted on search interest are ex post validating
since they correspond well to the motivation states legalize medical marijuana in the first place.
Conversely, interest in the health consequences of marijuana use does experience increases
after RML takes into full effect, with the increase coming potentially from both users and
prospective users.
A natural question that arises from the above exercise is whether legalization-induced
increases in search interest are large enough to bear significance, as search data reported by GT
do not represent actual counts but a set of normalized indices. To put these numbers into
some perspective, I rely on two cases that help us gauge the magnitude of these policy effects.
On June 23, 2016, the U.K. government passed a referendum, paving its way to leave the
European Union (EU) system. For many Britons and the then Prime Minister, June 23 was a day
that came as quite a shock. The currency markets plummeted following the decision and
Google searches for maintaining the EU citizenship (people of Irish descent in particular) spiked.
Search volumes associated with “Irish passport” increased by 100 percent on the next day and

In the baseline model specification, enforcing MML is shown to raise interest in this domain by 28 percent (p <
0.1). However, incorporating the state-specific linear trends reduces the magnitude to virtually zero and further
adding the state-specific quadratic trends reverse the sign of coefficient. The inconsistency due to model
specification makes me conclude that the impact of MML is negligible.
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search volumes associated with “dual citizenship” doubled (BBC News 2016). To the extent
that a 100 percent increase in search volumes exemplifies an event’s significance, legalizing
marijuana for medical and, in particular, recreational purposes shall bear similar importance to
the referendum decision. Moreover, it is important to note that reported surges in “Irish
passport” are not covariates adjusted and are only measured on a single day instead of over a
month. Hence, even in the absence of policy effects, search data used in my analysis will be
diluted in magnitude. The second case comes from a defining moment in the U.S. A few hours
after the election results on Super Tuesday 2016 were posted, Google searches for “How to
move to Canada” increased by 350 percent (Uria 2016). As above, reported surges are not
covariates adjusted and, this time, they are measured on an hourly basis.
The key implications of Table 1.3 for the analysis of marijuana legalization effects are
that allowing recreational marijuana use has raised people’s interest in more than just news. It
boosted interest in marijuana use as well as the health concerns of use, with the impacts being
particularly evident upon the law’s implementation/enforcement. When comparing to the
spiked Google searches in the wake of two political events, heightened interest induced by RML
implies that marijuana legalization bears significance. Comparing to RML, legalizing marijuana
for medical purposes only changed search interest in news and elevated interest appears to be
short-lived. How durable are the RML-induced interest increase in marijuana news, marijuana
use, and potential health concerns of use? My next task is to examine this dynamic response of
search interests to the recreational marijuana legalization.
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4.2 Event-Study Design and The Dynamic Response of Search Interests to RML
This subsection looks at the dynamic behavioral response in searches to RML using fullyadjusted an event-study research design. Table 1.4 presents the estimated RML effects on
search interest in marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects of use. Like in Table
1.3, regressions here are estimated with one observation per state per year per month. The
event-study design takes the form
(2)

𝑞

𝑞

𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑚 = ∑𝜏=1 𝛿+𝜏 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑠,𝑡̃+𝜏 + ∑𝑚
𝜏=0 𝛿−𝜏 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑠,𝑡̃ −𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1 𝑏+𝜏 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑠,𝑡̃+𝜏 +
′
∑𝑚
𝜏=0 𝑏−𝜏 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑠,𝑡̃−𝜏 + 𝛤 𝑿𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑚 ,

where 𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑠,𝑡̃ documents the enactment of RML in a given state, year, and month, 𝛿+𝜏 denotes
RML’s anticipatory effects, and 𝛿−𝜏 denotes its lagged effects.18 I set 𝑞 equal to 10 and allow
𝛿+10 to reflect RML’s anticipatory effects on search interest when RML will not be enacted in 10
or more months, and 𝛿+9 to reflect its anticipatory effects when the enactment will occur in
another 9 months. The reference group denotes the anticipatory effect when RML will not be
enacted in one month and 𝛿0 denotes its contemporaneous effect. Analogously, I set 𝑚 equal
to 10 and allow 𝛿−10 to reflect the lagged RML effect on search interest when RML has been
effective for 10 or more months. The remaining lagged effects are defined accordingly. In this
subsection, I focus on the dynamic impacts of RML, but a full set of MML events is included in
(2). Vector 𝑿, state effects 𝜸𝑠 , and year-month effects 𝝀𝑡𝑚 are defined exactly as in (1). For
comparison purposes, I report estimates derived from (2) with the state-specific linear or
quadratic trends added. Defining event time relative to RML’s enactment instead of its
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I have combined year and month into a single indicator variable 𝑡̃.
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implementation/enforcement allows me to detect if the increased interest due to the law’s
enactment is in fact transitory (Table 1.3), and whether enforcing RML makes any lingering
impacts on Google searches. Table 1.1 shows that the average time lapse between RML’s
enactment and implementation/enforcement is roughly 6 months. Hence, having a 10-month
lag is sufficient to capture the law’s intermediate effects after the law becomes fully effective.
For ease of exposition, regression coefficients along with their 95% confidence intervals
(Table 1.4) are presented in Figure 1.3 where Panel A, B, and C use search interest in marijuana
news, marijuana use, and the health effects of use in turn as the outcome variable. 19 For the
corresponding estimates on MML, Figure 1.5 presents their coefficients as well as the 95%
confidence intervals generated within the same regression. For the most part, RML’s
anticipatory effects on marijuana interest are statistically indistinguishable from zero, providing
a degree of confidence that historical interest does not drive policy decisions on legalizing
recreational marijuana use. However, there are a few cases where the policy leads are
statistically significant, which work against my argument. Because in principle there should be
no impacts in the pre-policy window if MML and RML are truly exogenous, do these statistically
significant policy leads nullify the common trends assumption? I think they need not be if
political debates about the feasibility of MML and RML bring media attention and press
coverage. In fact that both legalizations have generated considerable debate in academia and
the policy circle, and a few significant policy leads may not be unexpected.

Figure 1.3 is based on the model with state-specific linear time trends included. In practice, the largely
consistent point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals allow one to use any specification in Table 1.4 to reconstruct this figure and the results will be similar.
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Turning to the time point at which RML is enacted (𝑡=0), there is a noticeable increase in
search interest in marijuana news and use, but not so much in the health effects of use. The
heightened interest is, however, short-lived, illustrated by the reduction in magnitudes
immediately following the policy change. The diminished interest then persists for several
months until RML becomes fully implemented (approximately six months upon its enactment),
after which search interest has elevated, remained high, and is no longer transient. In the case
of marijuana news, RML’s impacts appear to rise over time. Together, Figure 1.3 suggests that
enforcing RML has had lasting impacts on search interest in marijuana news, marijuana use,
and the health effects of use.20 In contrary to the sustained impacts of RML, enacting MML
only made a momentary boost in interest in marijuana news (Figure 1.5), and there is no
further evidence that MML raised interest in any other aspects. Overall, results from the eventstudy research design echo the patterns suggested in the reduced form models (Table 1.3),
confirming that RML has had positive impacts on search interest in all three dimensions while
MML’s influence is limited to marijuana news.
The not so perfect parallel trends (Figure 1.2) and a sprinkle of statistically significant
policy leads (Figure 1.3) may still cast doubt on the estimated impacts of RML using
specifications in (1) and (2). Although the estimated policy effects are robust to the inclusion of
state-specific trends, it may still be that unobserved factors trend in some other ways and the
state-specific linear or quadratic trends do not suffice to capture. To address this concern, I
adopt the synthetic control method (SCM) in the next subsection to assess the robustness of

Unlike MML, very few states have RML implemented by the end of the study period, and the
implementation/enactment of RML is nearing the end of my sample period. It is thus unsurprising that the
estimates of RML are much noisier than that of MML.
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RML effects, and I proceed in two directions. First, I rely on SCM’s built-in function to illustrate
RML treatment effects on search interest in each dimension for every reform state. I then run a
DD-style regression harnessing the SCM-weighted sample and gauge the extent to which DD
estimates derived from the SCM-weighted sample deviate from those reported in my baseline
sample. If the difference is visibly large, then using DD estimates generated under the SCMweighted sample may be preferable since SCM is better suited to evaluating the policy effects
when the common trends assumption does not hold.

4.3 Synthetic Control Method and RML’s Impacts on Search Interest
Pioneered by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), SCM has gained growing
attention in the policy evaluation literature. While a detailed explanation of the method is
outside the scope of this study, its essential idea can be summarized as follows: search indices
in a few pre-policy periods and the means of state-level covariates (Table 1.2) over the entire
pre-policy window are utilized to form the “best” linear combination of control states where
RMLs have not yet implemented. I apply SCM to each RML state for each set of search indices
by first excluding the other RML states from the analysis sample. For instance, when search
interest in marijuana news is the focus, the synthetic control state generated for Washington is
a composite of 9.5% Arizona, 11.4% Georgia, 31.3% Michigan, 29.3% Minnesota, 3.7%
Montana, 2.6% Rhode Island, and 12% Virginia. When interest in marijuana use is the focus, a
different composite of states is selected.
Figure 1.4-1.6 illustrate RML treatment effects on search interest in marijuana news,
marijuana use, and the health effects of use. Examining RML effects on a state-by-state basis
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allows one to explore policy heterogeneity across states, whereas the reduced form models
(Table 1.3) would not do. For the most part, search interests in the synthetically matched
states track those in the RML states reasonably well in the pre-policy periods. Only in a few
cases where search indices are volatile, estimation noise can be large, and deviations between
two trends are possible. Turning to Figure 1.4 where search interest in marijuana news is the
focus, I find that RML raises interest in Washington, Colorado, Alaska, D.C, Oregon, and
California. In Figure 1.5, where interest in marijuana use is the focus, I find that RML raises such
interest in nearly all reform states though the magnitudes are larger and treatment effects are
more noticeable in Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and California than in Alaska and
Massachusetts. In Figure 1.6, I find that RML raises interest in the health effects of marijuana
use primarily in Washington, Colorado, and Oregon. Note that, in Massachusetts, Nevada, and
California, the enactment of RML is nearing the end of my sample period; therefore, any effects
of RML on search interests may be hard to detect. In sum, Figure 1.4-1.6 suggest that the RML
treatment effects are not driven purely by a single reform state.
I then run a DD-style regression harnessing the SCM-weighted sample to quantify RML
treatment effects. This method has been applied in Courtemanche and Zapta (2014), Choi et al.
(2016), and many others. In particular, I form the SCM-weighted sample by pooling the
individually created synthetic sample over the entire study period and keep the synthetic
weights unchanged. Before presenting the regression results, it is useful to assess the common
trends assumption, which is required for consistency of the DD treatment effects. Figure 1.6
shows the trends of search interest in marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects of
use, constructed in a way analogous to Figure 1.1 and 1.2. I also add to the figure a lowess-
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smoothed curve, graphed as the difference of search indices in the reform and the synthetically
matched states relative to the month of RML change. Figure 1.6 suggests that the common
trends assumption is very likely to hold in this case, as shown by the relatively flat lowesssmoothed curve in the pre-policy periods. Therefore, a consistent RML treatment effect can be
derived using the DD-style model specification.21 Table 1.5 reports the corresponding
estimates from the SCM-weighted sample. Standard errors, shown in square brackets, are
calculated using Donald and Lang’s (2007) two-step estimator. For comparison purposes,
results in Table 1.3 are printed under column (1) – (3). It is quite reassuring that not only
enforcing RML continues to exert positive impacts on all search interest, the magnitudes are on
par with those derived from the baseline sample.
Together, the above analyses on the impacts of marijuana legalization on search interest
yield three robust findings. First, legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes boosts search
interest in all three aspects, with the influence being especially pronounced after RML
becoming fully effective. Second, unlike RML, legalizing marijuana for medical purposes
influences searches related only to marijuana news but not use or the adverse health effects of
use, a result that is consistent with the empirical regularity identified in the existing literature
where MML had limited impacts on youth marijuana use. And third, spikes in interest triggered
by the enactment of MML and RML are short-lived, but interest has elevated and persisted
after RML being fully implemented.

Whether the common trends condition holds in Panel (C) is less obvious, however. Nevertheless, a simple test
relating the difference of search indices to a set of dummy variables indicating the pre-policy periods reveals that
less than 1% of the regression coefficients are statistically different from the RML enactment dummy variable,
which is the reference group.
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Empirical findings in the marketing and business literature have shown that informationseeking is tightly connected with near-term behavior changes. In light of that result, a natural
question to ask is whether a higher level of search interest in marijuana use would predict a
higher prevalence of youth marijuana use and a higher level of search interest in the adverse
health effects of marijuana use would predict a reduced level of youth marijuana use. The next
section turns to this question and provides a primitive analysis of the connection between
information search and youth marijuana use.

5. Search Interest in Marijuana Use and the Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use and
Youth Marijuana Use
My empirical analysis in this section builds on and relates to two strands of literature in
marketing and public health that study the interaction of information seeking and behavior
change. In particular, I link state-level searches reflecting interest in marijuana use and the
adverse health effects of marijuana use to the micro-level data for 2005-2015 from the
combined national and state Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), and examine how information
searches relate to youth behavior change in marijuana use.22
Unlike the preceding analyses, the intention of linking search activities to youth
marijuana use is not to uncover the causal impacts of information seeking, as the intent of
information seeking is most likely endogenously determined. Rather, my purpose here is to
detect if Google searches exhibit any predictive power in observing behavior changes. Like in
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The 2015 YRBS is the most recent wave at the time of conducting this study.
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many causal inference studies, even the bivariate correlation can motivate further and detailed
research (Chetty et al. 2014).
YRBS is one of many leading data sources that monitor youth risky behaviors. Started in
1991, YRBS has surveyed thousands of high school students around the country and has been
implemented every other year. The national YRBS is conducted by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the state YRBS, while coordinated by CDC, is usually
administered by state health departments or education agencies. In this analysis, I combine
two versions of YRBS to maximize sample sizes.23 Over the period 2005–2015, all states have
conducted two or more waves of surveys and all have asked the question with regard to how
many times youth used marijuana in the past month. Following CDC’s benchmark, I define
youth as current marijuana users if any day of past 30-day use is reported at the time of the
survey.24 I use a similar dichotomization strategy, imposed at each response threshold (𝟏[𝑦𝑖 ≥
𝜏c ]), to detect the relationship between search interests and youth marijuana use on the
remaining part of the distribution.
I estimate the association between search interests and youth marijuana use using
specifications analogous to that above, which takes the form
(3)

𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛤 ′ 𝐗 𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 ,

Prior studies have also made use of the combined national and state YRBS for policy evaluations (Hansen, Sabia,
and Rees 2017, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2015, Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2017). The starting year of 2005 is
chosen because the earliest data point in GT is 2004 and YRBS provides data in odd years only.
24 The survey question is worded as, “During the past 30 days, how many times did you use marijuana?” And the
possible responses are “0 times; 1 or 2 times; 3 to 9 times; 10 to 19 times; 20 to 39 times; 40 or more.”
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35

where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a binary indicator denoting the outcome of interest (for instance, youth used
marijuana at least once over the past month, youth used marijuana at least three times over
the past month, and so forth). Vector 𝐗 contains youth demographic characteristics and the
state-level covariates (Table 1.2), and 𝜸𝑠 and 𝝀𝑡 represent state and year fixed effects.25 The
key variable of interest, 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 , is measured at the state by year level and has been
normalized into Z-scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Unlike the above
analyses where I can map search data to the month of RML change, I am unable to do so when
pairing search data with youth in the YRBS dataset simply because survey dates are not
available. As many states conduct surveys in the spring when classes are in session, I therefore
restrict the search data to January and February in a given survey year and match them to
youth based on the state of residence. For comparison purposes, I report estimates generated
using variants of the specification in (3), such as one that excludes vector 𝐗 but retains state
and year fixed effects, and one that further incorporates the state-specific time trends.
Coefficient 𝑏1 measures the average effect of a one standard deviation change in search
interest on the propensity of youth using marijuana at different intensity levels. As emphasized
above, 𝑏1 does not represent the causal impact of searching on youth marijuana use. Standard
errors reported here are clustered at the state level.
Table 1.6 presents estimates of (3) for youth being a current marijuana user. Panel A
uses search indices that reflect interest in marijuana use while Panel B uses search indices
reflecting interest in the adverse health effects of use. Estimates in column (1) – (5) illustrate
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Individual demographic characteristics include dummy variables for gender, age, race, and grade levels.
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the progressive change in the strength of association between search interest and youth
likelihood of using marijuana over the past month. Panel A suggests that search interest in
marijuana use is positively related to youth marijuana use, with a one standard deviation
increase in search interest associated with a 0.5 percentage point (pp) increase in the likelihood
of youth using marijuana over the past month. This relationship remains strongly consistent
across different models, though some are estimated with less precision when state-specific
trends are present.26 Panel B, on the contrary, suggests that the likelihood of youth being a
current marijuana user would decrease by 0.2 pp for the same amount of increase in online
searches, but this time, reflecting interest in the adverse health effects of marijuana use.
While featuring two different dimensions, search indices used in Panel A and B are
normalized Z-scores; therefore, their marginal effects are directly comparable. Then, why is the
association between search interest in the adverse health effects of marijuana use and youth
marijuana use consistently smaller in strength than that between the interest in marijuana use
and youth marijuana use? I think of two potential explanations. One is consistent with the
model of present bias (Laibson 1997), as youth view the marginal health costs of marijuana use
at any moment much smaller than the utility they get from smoking marijuana at that moment,
thereby over-discounting the adverse health effects of marijuana use which are manifested in
future. The other explanation is consistent with the model of projection bias (Loewenstein,
O'Donoghue, and Rabin 2003), where youth show over-confidence in the degree to which their
future taste in marijuana and their abilities to stop using marijuana resemble their current

In an earlier version of this study, I also run the specification in (3) by applying the underage population as
weight. The point estimates from the weighted regressions are a bit larger but are estimated with less precision.
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tastes and abilities, not fully recognizing the drawbacks of addiction and inaccurately predicting
how tastes and abilities will evolve when they smoke marijuana. This seems likely for those
who are marijuana experimenters.
Table 1.8 presents estimates of (3) for youth marijuana use across the entire distribution
and is structured similarly to Table 1.6. In the interest of space, I show results from
specifications that control for youth demographic characteristics, state-level covariates, and
state and year fixed effects. Search interest in marijuana use is positively associated with youth
marijuana use across the distribution, though the magnitude diminishes as we move along the
“intensive” margin. Two explanations may account for this finding. The first is that youth
obtain new information about marijuana on Google, such as where to obtain it and which
sources offer the lowest price, and such information leads to subsequent behavior changes. An
alternative hypothesis is that youth who have a high propensity to smoke marijuana or have
been smoking it more intensively are keener to find out such relevant information. While I am
unable to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, a key point to note is that search
data measure search interest for the entire population while YRBS records risky behaviors only
for youth. Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps more plausible that the obtained
information can mediate the effects of information search on behavior change.
Panel B suggests that search interest in the adverse health effects of marijuana use may
only be able to predict youth marijuana use along the extensive margin but not the “intensive”
margin. Provided that search data are not generated by youth alone, results here suggest that
making accurate information about the health consequences of marijuana use available and
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highly ranked in online searches may help prevent youth who are on the verge of
experimenting marijuana from initiation.
Using data from MTF spanning 2010–2015, Cerda et al. (2016) find that, in Washington,
enacting RML is associated with 3.2% and 5% increase in the likelihood of marijuana use among
youth who are in the 8th and 10th grade.27 Using information reported in their Table 1.3, I
impute the corresponding change to be 0.2 and 0.9 pp for youth in these two grade levels. To
map the relationship between search interest and youth marijuana use into their findings, I rerun the specification in (3) by excluding all the other RML-states but Washington in the analysis
sample. Results reported in Table 1.9 suggest that the estimated association is virtually
unchanged to that derived from the baseline sample. If I assume that elevated search interest
in marijuana use is the only channel that bridges RML and youth marijuana use, then
multiplying 70% (estimates in Panel B of Table 1.3 in the baseline model) with 0.5 (estimates in
Table 1.9) yields a 0.35 pp increase in the likelihood of youth marijuana use that will be induced
by RML. Since Cerda et al. find little to no impact of RML on youth marijuana use among those
who are in the 12th grade, their weighted average policy effects come to be 3.6 pp. This is not
far from my calculation. 28
I also split the sample into different grade levels and re-run the specification in (3) to
probe the heterogeneity in the relationship between search interest in marijuana use and

The differential changes in marijuana use rates among 12th graders are small and not statistically significant
from zero.
28 This thought experiment motivates another strategy to study the relationship between search interest in
marijuana use and youth marijuana use. To isolate the effect of search interest that comes solely from RML, I can
use RML to instrument for search indices as the first stage under the stylized 2SLS framework. However, the
exclusion criterion is almost surely violated in this case; as a result, I do not pursue this instrumental variable
strategy.
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youth marijuana use. I find that the association is stronger among seniors (11th and 12th
grades) than juniors (9th and 10th grades), but the difference is not statistically significant.
The preceding analyses have shown that enforcing RML has a sustained impact on
search interest in marijuana use. In light of this finding, a natural question is whether the
sustained interest would still predict a higher level of youth marijuana use in the post-RML
periods. While the question is of interest by itself, my analysis sample does not permit an
analogous examination as most RML states implement/enforce the law after 2015 and YRBS
ends in 2015. However, a simple bivariate regression using states that have enforced the law
before 2015 suggests that the relationship remains positive.29
Table 1.10 shows a simple placebo test asking whether search interest in marijuana use
is also associated with youth use of other substances. Apart from the positive relationship
observed in youth marijuana use, there is little to no evidence that search interest is also
associated with youth smoking, drinking, or binge drinking. Results here suggest that search
indices reflecting a specific interest are not contaminated by the underlying motives to engage
in alternative risky behaviors.

6. Discussion and Conclusion
Motivated by the question of whether legalization of recreational marijuana would
increase youth marijuana use, this study takes an innovative approach to answering this

The regression, which uses variation in search interests across states, has a coefficient of 0.03 and a
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error of 0.01.
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question through the lens of information search. Using data from Google Trends, I first
examine the impacts of marijuana legalization – medical and recreational – on people's search
interest in marijuana news, marijuana use, and the health effects of marijuana use. Using
quasi-experimental methods, I show that RML boosts interest in all three dimensions while
MML influences searches related only to news. Event-study designs further suggest that
galvanized interest in these dimensions is not transitory, especially after RML became fully
effective. I then link state-level searches reflecting interest in marijuana use and the adverse
health effects of use to the micro-level data from YRBS, and investigate the association
between information search and youth marijuana use. I find that higher levels of search
interest in marijuana use predict higher levels of youth marijuana use and higher levels of
interest in the health consequence of marijuana use associate negatively with youth marijuana
use. Though online searches have predictive power in explaining youth marijuana use, the
estimated relation does not lend itself to the causal impact of information seeking on behavior
changes.
In light of the salience effects (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009), my empirical finding on
the interaction of information search and youth marijuana use carries an important implication
for public policy: making accurate information on the health consequences of marijuana use
highly ranked in online searches. Marijuana has well-documented therapeutic value but can
pose deep harm and risks to youth. As Google continues to refine its search engine, introducing
functions such as autofilling and prompting users to search for additional terms, behavioral
nudges or nudge regulations like the above could be useful policy interventions (DeCicca et al.
2017).
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The study has limitations that offer directions for future research. First, I have
presented evidence that recreational marijuana legalization raises search interest in marijuana
use, which is positively associated with youth marijuana use. Such finding, however, does not
automatically imply that RML will increase youth marijuana use. Future research with data that
are not yet available is necessary to directly test this possibility. Second, Google Trends reflect
search behavior for the entire population while YRBS documents behavior for youth only. It
would be interesting to see if search interest in marijuana use is also associated with adult
marijuana use. Finally, and most importantly, I have not been able to distinguish between two
possible explanations for the RML effects on search activity. One is that heightened search
activities may simply serve as a proxy for increased interest, which can lead to subsequent
changes in demand. An alternative hypothesis is that information obtained through Google
may alter one’s perception and underlying preferences, in which case information would
causally affect subsequent choice and decision. The fact that RML influences searches not only
related to the source of finding marijuana but also to the health concerns of marijuana use
suggests that the second explanation is at work to at least some extent. However, more
research is needed to rigorously disentangle these competing possibilities.
The debate between legalizing marijuana and maintaining its Schedule I status has
generated substantial controversy in policy discussions. Hidden among the growing public
support for marijuana legalization is the concern that too much freedom may backfire. Recent
public discussion about medical marijuana has already led to a reduced perception of harm
among youth (National Institute on Drug Abuse for Teens 2017), and allowing adults to smoke
marijuana freely may deepen this perception further. Traditional policy evaluation has relied
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on survey data whose reporting lags may keep policymakers from finding the answer when it is
most needed. With the rising popularity and accessibility of Google search data, sensible
policies may be crafted even when a rigorous program evaluation cannot be implemented.
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Table 1.1 – Marijuana Legalization Laws by State

Notes: information on the medical and recreational marijuana legalization come from Marijuana Policy Project, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s Marijuana Resource Center, NORML, and Choi,
Dave, and Sabia (2016).
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Table 1.2 – Summary Statistics of Search Indices and State-level Covariates

Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. Search indices are extracted from Google Trends using search terms
defined in the text. Data for state unemployment rates, state non-institutional population, and labor force come from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Data for unemployment insurance claims come
from the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. The remaining variables that portray the state
demographic makeups come from Current Population Survey Basic Monthly Data. Search indices 1 capture interest in
marijuana in general. Search indices 2 capture interest in marijuana use. Search indices 3 capture interest in the health
effects of marijuana use.
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Table 1.3 – Impacts of Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
State-level covariates include state unemployment rates, natural logarithm of labor force, natural logarithm of non-institutional population, labor force
as % of population, insured unemployment rates, initial UI claims, continued UI claims, covered employment (in 1,000s), initial UI claims as % of covered
employment, %white, %black, %hispanic, %without high school diploma, %with at least college diploma, the sub-provisions of Medical Marijuana
Legalization, and marijuana decriminalization law, all of which are measured at the state by year by month level.
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Table 1.4 – Impacts of Recreational Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest: Event-study
Design

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
State-level covariates include state unemployment rates, natural logarithm of labor force, natural logarithm of non-institutional population, labor force as %
of population, insured unemployment rates, initial UI claims, continued UI claims, covered employment (in 1,000s), initial UI claims as % of covered
employment, %white, %black, %hispanic, %without high school diploma, %with at least college diploma, the sub-provisions of Medical Marijuana
Legalization, and marijuana decriminalization law, all of which are measured at the state by year by month level.
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Table 1.5 – Impacts of Recreational Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Results under columns (1) – (3) come from Table 1.3. Donald and Lang (2007) standard errors, estimated in two steps and
shown in square brackets, are reported under the SCM-weighted sample.
SCM-weighted sample is formed by pooling all the information from the reform states as well as their synthetically
matched states from January 1, 2004 to August 31, 2017.
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Table 1.6 – Search Interest in Marijuana and Youth Marijuana Use: National and State YRBS:
2005 – 2015

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Individual-level covariates: dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels are included.
State-level covariates listed in the summary statistics table as well as the sub-provisions of medical marijuana legalization
are included.
Youth is defined as a current marijuana user if he used marijuana at least once over the past 30 days.
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Table 1.7 – Impacts of Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest in Doctor Appointment

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
State-level covariates include state unemployment rates, natural logarithm of labor force, natural logarithm of noninstitutional population, labor force as % of population, insured unemployment rates, initial UI claims, continued UI
claims, covered employment (in 1,000s), initial UI claims as % of covered
employment, %white, %black, %hispanic, %without high school diploma, %with at least college diploma, the subprovisions of Medical Marijuana Legalization, and marijuana decriminalization law, all of which are measured at the state
by year by month level.
Search indices are extracted from Google Trends using term “doctor appointment.”

50

Table 1.8 – Search Interest in Marijuana Use and Youth Marijuana Use: National and State
YRBS: 2005 – 2015

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Individual-level and state-level covariates are included. State FEs and year FEs are also included.
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Table 1.9 – Search Interest in Marijuana Use and Youth Marijuana Use: National and State
YRBS: 2005 – 2015

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Individual-level and state-level covariates are included. State FEs and year FEs are also included.
Washington is the only RML-state in the estimation sample.

Table 1.10 – Search Interest in Marijuana Use and Youth Marijuana Use: National and State
YRBS: 2005 – 2015

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Individual-level and state-level covariates are included. State FEs and year FEs are also included.
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Figure 1.1 – Normalized Search Indices: Reform States vs. Non-reform States: States further implemented RML are excluded
Notes: each of the non-reform states is assigned a pseudo-reform date, drawing from the true distribution of MML enactment dates from the reform states. Different reform
dates are then normalized to time zero. Negative values on the horizontal axis denote time periods leading up to the legalization and positive values denote time periods
afterwards.
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Figure 1.2 – Normalized Search Indices: Reform States vs. Non-reform States: States that only implemented MML are excluded
Notes: each of the non-reform states is assigned a pseudo-reform date, drawing from the true distribution of MML enactment dates from the reform states. Different
reform dates are then normalized to time zero. Negative values on the horizontal axis denote time periods leading up to the legalization and positive values denote time
periods afterwards.
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Figure 1.3 – Impacts of Recreational Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest: Event-study Design Regression
Notes: point estimates along with their 95% confidence intervals under columns 4-6 from Table 1.4 are plotted.
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Figure 1.4 – Search Interest in Marijuana News: SCM
Notes: Solid lines represent states that implemented RML and dashed lines represent their synthetically matched states. Vertical dashed lines represent the month
RML was enacted. SCM is run on each RML state by first excluding all the other RML-states from the estimation sample.
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Figure 1.5 – Search Interest in Marijuana Use: SCM
Notes: Solid lines represent states that implemented RML and dashed lines represent their synthetically matched states. Vertical dashed lines represent the
month RML was enacted. SCM is run on each RML state by first excluding all the other RML-states from the estimation sample.
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Figure 1.6 – Search Interest in the Health Effects of Marijuana Use: SCM
Notes: Solid lines represent states that implemented RML and dashed lines represent their synthetically matched states. Vertical dashed lines represent the
month RML was enacted. SCM is run on each RML state by first excluding all the other RML-states from the estimation sample.
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Figure 1.7 – Impacts of Medical Marijuana Legalization on Search Interest: Event-study Design Regression
Notes: point estimates along with their 95% confidence intervals under columns 4-6 from Table 1.4 are plotted. For the space of interest, they are not
shown in Table 1.4.

59

Figure 1.8 – Normalized Search Indices: Reform States vs. Non-reform States: SCM-weighted Sample
Notes: The SCM-weighted sample is formed by pooling all the information from the reform states as well as their synthetically matched states from January 1,
2004 to August 31, 2017. Blue solid lines indicate RML states and dashed lines indicate the synthetically matched states. Red solid lines are the lowess-smoothed
curves created by graphing the differences of search indices between the reform states and their synthetically matched states relative to the month of RML
change. The vertical dashed line indicates the time RML was enacted.
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CHAPTER 2
The Effects of E-Cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age Laws on Youth Substance Use 30
1. Introduction
Teenage substance use continues to be a major public health concern. Substance use
has been linked with poor academic performance, impaired cognitive development, other
mental and physical health problems, and motor-vehicle accidents (National Institute on Drug
Abuse , National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 2016). Tobacco, marijuana, and
alcohol are among the most widely used substances by adolescents. Although rates of youth
smoking are declining, each day more than 3,200 youth initiate cigarette consumption and
more than 2,000 transition into daily smoking (US Department of Health Human Services 2014).
Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug, with 22% of high school seniors reporting
past month use. Moreover, alcohol use among youth is even more widespread than the use of
tobacco or illicit drugs. Almost one out of three youth has consumed alcohol in the past month,
and almost one out of five has participated in binge drinking (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2015).
Though a large economics literature has examined the cross-relationship between
smoking, drinking and marijuana use (Dee 1999, Gruber, Sen, and Stabile 2003, Picone, Sloan,
and Trogdon 2004, Chaloupka et al. 1999, Farrelly et al. 2001), the introduction of electronic
cigarettes (e-cigarettes or e-cigs) presents youth with an alternative that could disrupt their use
of these substances. E-cigarettes are a particular type of vaping device within the broader class

This chapter is a joint work with Dhaval Dave from Bentley University and Michael Pesko from Georgia State
University.
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of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), and differ primarily from conventional cigarettes
by permitting the inhalation of nicotine that is heated rather than combusted, thereby
substantially reducing the harm associated with combustion-related byproducts. Since their
introduction into the U.S market, e-cigarettes have been advertised and positioned as
alternatives to conventional cigarettes, and their popularity particularly among youth has risen
exponentially.31 Within a four-year period (2011-2015), e-cigarette use has increased from
1.5% to 16.0% among high school students and from 0.6% to 5.3% among middle school
students, surpassing cigarettes as the most commonly used tobacco product among
adolescents (Singh 2016).32
A heated policy debate concerning the regulation of e-cigarettes has ensued, at the
heart of which are fundamental questions regarding the relative risks between e-cigarettes and
conventional cigarettes and the potential for e-cigarettes to serve as a tool towards tobacco
harm reduction. A recent report issued by the British government suggests that e-cigarettes
are no more than five percent as harmful as conventional cigarettes (Tobacco Advisory Group
of the Royal College of Physicians 2016). Other studies have suggested that e-cigarettes can
direct smokers away from smoking and possibly help them quit (Hampton 2014, Abrams 2014,
Brandon et al. 2015, McNeill et al. 2015). However, the 2016 Surgeon General’s Report warns
that e-cigarettes are dangerous to adolescents because they can interfere with cognitive
development and can cause nicotine addiction (US Department of Health Human Services

The Tobacco Control Act of 2009 gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction over tobacco
products, and this “deeming” rule was finalized in 2016.
32 Among adults, the 2014 National Health Interview Survey shows that 12.6% had ever used e-cigarettes at least
once and 3.7% currently use e-cigarettes (Schoenborn and Gindi 2015).
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2016). One particular concern is that e-cigarettes may act as a gateway towards the use of
other addictive substances, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana (Gostin and Glasner
2014, Primack et al. 2015, Mammen, Rehm, and Rueda 2016). While the downward trend in
youth smoking indicates a reduction in the number of new initiates, possibly because some of
these youth are starting to use e-cigarettes instead, it is not clear that this trend is necessarily
harm-reducing since youth who initiate nicotine with e-cigarettes may transition to smoking at
some later point in time or transition to dual use. Polysubstance use is also quite prevalent
among youth, which may lead to further spillovers from tobacco use into the use of other
substances such as alcohol or marijuana.33
In response, state governments passed a wave of regulations limiting youth access to ecigarettes. A popular initiative has been the adoption of Minimum Legal Sale Age (MLSA) laws
on e-cigarettes analogous to those passed for conventional cigarettes decades ago. New Jersey
became the first state to implement an e-cigarette MLSA law in March of 2010, followed by
four other states later within the same year.34 Additional states adopted an e-cigarette MLSA
law in each year subsequently, and by the time the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
mandated a federal e-cigarette MLSA law of 18 in August of 2016, all states but two had an ecigarette MLSA law in place.35

Data from Wave 4 of the Add Health Survey indicated that 34% of youth reported either early use of both
alcohol and marijuana, or alcohol, marijuana, and cigarettes (Moss, Cen, and Yi 2014).
34 Utah, New Hampshire, Minnesota, and California enforced the law on May 11, July 31, August 1, and September
27, all in 2010, respectively.
35 Table 2.11 provides a list of states that have implemented the e-cigarette MLSA laws over our sample period
spanning 2005-2015.
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Youth use of e-cigarettes, or vaping, is predicted to decline as costs and other
components of the “full price” associated with the product rise due to restrictions on youth
access. The effect of e-cigarette MLSA laws on smoking and the use of other addictive
substances is a priori ambiguous. If e-cigarettes are economic substitutes with other tobacco
products or other addictive substances, then e-cigarette restrictions may induce substitution
toward smoking and other substance use, counteracting some of the intended public health
gains. On the other hand, if these substances are economic complements, contemporaneously
and intertemporally, then restricting e-cigarette access will additionally reduce smoking and the
addictive stock of nicotine, and possibly drinking and marijuana use, among youth currently and
as they transition into adulthood. Understanding such policy-driven spillovers and cross-price
effects are integral towards informing the debate underlying e-cigarettes and designing optimal
regulatory policy.
In this study we assess whether, and the extent to which, restricting youth access to ecigarettes has affected their use of other addictive substances. We contribute to the limited
literature on the effects of e-cigarette MLSA laws in several ways. First, the few studies that
have explored the effect of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth smoking have arrived at mixed
conclusions, and our study attempts to provide further clarity to this conflicting evidence base
(Friedman 2015, Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal 2016, Abouk and Adams 2017). Second, we extend
the prior work and provide the first evidence on the intertemporal relationship between ecigarette MLSA laws and youth smoking. In addition to any contemporaneous effects, by
affecting the addictive nicotine stock, e-cigarette MLSA laws may also have dynamic effects.
Our study informs whether a policy that makes vaping less attractive today makes future
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smoking more or less likely when youth are no longer subject to the MLSA-based restriction. As
noted above, this intertemporal transition from e-cigarette use to smoking among youth forms
one of the key questions underlying the policy debate. Third, we broaden the lens to other
addictive substances and provide some of the first evidence on potential spillover effects of ecigarette MLSA laws on other substance use. Such spillover effects are plausible given the high
co-occurrence of and transitions between alcohol, marijuana, and tobacco use among
adolescents.36
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
background and a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines a conceptual framework
of the various channels through which e-cigarette MLSA laws may affect substance use, and
motivates our empirical specifications. Section 4 describes the assembled data, followed by a
description of the empirical approach in section 5. We present the findings in section 6, and
the final section discusses some of the implications of these results.

2. Relevant Studies
Individual states have made several efforts in recent decades to tighten tobacco control
regulations by prohibiting retailers from selling tobacco products to minors. Several studies
have examined the efficacy of cigarette MLSA laws adopted between the 1980s and early 1990s
in curbing youth smoking. Though many of these studies suggest that the laws have been
effective in reducing youth smoking (Chaloupka and Pacula 1998, Gruber and Zinman 2001,

Data from the 2014 National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) suggest that, among youth ages 12-17 who
have used tobacco products in the past year, 88% have also consumed alcohol and 56% have used marijuana over
this period.
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Ahmad and Billimek 2007, DiFranza, Savageau, and Fletcher 2009), some find the law effects
are limited. Chaloupka and Grossman (1996) find little effect of youth access restrictions on
youth smoking, which they attribute to the weak enforcement of the laws. DeCicca and
colleagues (2002), using indices of smoking restrictions that ranged from youth access
restrictions to restrictions on smoking in public places, also find limited effects of the laws. A
recent study by Yoruk and Yoruk (2015) revisits the effect of cigarette MLSA laws on youth
smoking using a regression discontinuity design. They find that gaining legal access to tobacco
products once youth have aged out is associated with a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in the
probability of smoking, though the effects are imprecisely estimated. By focusing on a
subsample where youth had smoked in the prior wave, the authors find that cigarette MLSA
laws lead to a statistically significant increase in the probability of smoking (five percentage
points) and frequency of smoking (25% increase).
Several studies have focused specifically on the impact of e-cigarette MLSA laws.
Friedman (2015) and Pesko et al. (2016), based on state-aggregated data spanning up to 2013,
both find that e-cigarette MLSA laws have increased youth smoking by 0.8 to 0.9 percentage
points.37 These results are consistent with e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes being
economic substitutes, at least contemporaneously. In contrast, the results in Abouk and Adams
(2017) suggest complementarity between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. Their study finds that ecigarette MLSA laws have led to a reduction in smoking among high-school seniors (12th
graders), based on individual-level data spanning 2007-2014 from Monitoring the Future (MTF).

Friedman (2015) is based on 2-year state aggregated data from the NSDUH (spanning 2002-2013) and Pesko et
al. (2016) is based on the state-aggregated data from the Youth Risk Behavioral Surveillance System (YRBSS;
spanning 2007-2013).
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It is unclear whether the divergence in findings stems from the use of more granular individuallevel data or from the addition of one more study period.38
Our study extends this seminal work and contributes to this limited literature in three
important ways. First, we add to the thin evidence base by incorporating micro-level data from
both the national and the state YRBSS spanning up to 2015. This yields a substantially larger
sample size (over 700,000 observations) relative to Abouk and Adams 2017. Utilizing data up to
2015, just prior to the FDA’s national ban on e-cigarette sales to minors, further maximizes
policy variation (8 additional states had adopted these laws in 2015) and extends the postpolicy window for the other states to disentangle the law’s dynamic effects. Second-order
policy responses on youth substance use (other than e-cigarettes) are likely to be small, and
hence micro-level data with large sample sizes, more cleanly-defined affected groups, and
longer time windows with greater policy variation may be necessary for maximizing precision.
Second, prior work has focused only on the contemporaneous effects of e-cigarette MLSA laws
on smoking behaviors. Our study is the first to consider how these laws may affect youth
smoking rates once they have aged out of the restrictions and are able to purchase e-cigarettes.
This is particularly relevant for assessing long-term effects on smoking rates and addressing
public health concerns regarding the intertemporal transition from e-cigarettes to smoking.
Finally, we also estimate whether e-cigarette MLSA laws have had any spillover effects into the

A recent study by Pesko et al. (2018), pairing cigarette prices from the Nielsen retail scanner data with the
individual-level data from MTF, shows that higher cigarette prices are positively associated with youth use of ecigarettes, consistent with the argument that electronic and conventional cigarettes are economic substitutes.
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use of other addictive substances. With the exception of Pesko et al. (2016), who studied and
found no effects on marijuana use, prior work has mainly focused on cigarette smoking.

3. Conceptual Framework
The overall effect of e-cigarette MLSA laws on smoking, drinking, and marijuana use
depends on the marginal direct and indirect costs of youth obtaining e-cigarettes, and the
relationship between e-cigarettes and these other substances. Banning legal sales of ecigarettes to minors is predicted to raise the indirect costs of obtaining the product through
added inconvenience and/or associated time delays. The restrictions could also increase the
direct costs of obtaining the product through additional markups or youth having to pay
“friends” to purchase the product for them. E-cigarette MLSA laws will therefore raise the full
price of e-cigarettes, leading to first-order effects in the form of a decline in e-cigarette
consumption. However, the predicted decrease in e-cigarette consumption may be moderated
to the extent that retailers do not abide by the law or that youth are able to bypass the law
through online vendors. 39
Any rise in the indirect or direct costs of purchasing e-cigarettes would cause a relative
increase in the cost of e-cigarettes in comparison with conventional cigarettes, thereby
affecting not just e-cigarette use but also potentially shifting smoking behaviors. E-cigarettes
and conventional cigarettes are both alternate modes of delivering nicotine, and youth may

Data from the 2015 NYTS suggest however that only 1.1% of teens who used e-cigarettes in the past month
obtained them through online vendors. When we restrict the sample to high school aged youth (16 or above), only
1.8% of them obtained e-cigarettes over the Internet in the past month.
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substitute to smoking if e-cigarettes become relatively more difficult to procure. Additionally,
the e-cigarette MLSA laws may raise smoking if e-cigarettes are being used for smoking
cessation or for cutting down on cigarette consumption. Losing access to e-cigarettes could
therefore reduce a smoker’s propensity to attempt cessation. Though some studies have
documented the success of e-cigarettes in helping adult smokers quit (Etter and Bullen 2011,
Brown et al. 2014, Adkison et al. 2013), the cessation margin may be less salient when it comes
to youth. As most smokers initiate smoking prior to age 18, this initiation margin may be more
relevant for adolescents, and policies that restrict access to e-cigarettes may induce some
youth to initiate tobacco use with cigarettes instead.
While these channels underscore substitutability between e-cigarettes and conventional
cigarettes and predict an increase in smoking as a result of the e-cigarette MLSA laws, it is also
possible that e-cigarette restrictions may lead to a reduction in smoking. As with adults,
concurrent use of e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes is high among youth (Dutra and
Glantz 2014).40 If this pattern is reflective of economic complementarity, then policy-induced
reductions in e-cigarette use could reduce cigarette consumption. Furthermore, lower ecigarette use may reduce nicotine dependence, ceteris paribus, and make it less likely that
youth may turn to tobacco products in general to satisfy nicotine-induced cravings. E-cigarette
MLSA laws could also raise youth interest in the motive underlying the legal change and
encourage them to search for health information related to e-cigarettes and possibly other
substances, which could in turn change their attitudes toward consumption.

Dutra and Glantz (2014) report that 76.3% of current e-cigarette users also concurrently used conventional
cigarettes, based on the 2012 National Youth Tobacco Survey.
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The e-cigarette MLSA laws may also impact dynamic transitions between e-cigarette use
and smoking along channels similar to those discussed above. As with the contemporaneous
effects, these intertemporal effects of the e-cigarette restrictions on smoking, for instance what
happens to their smoking behaviors once adolescents have aged out of the restrictions, are also
a priori indeterminate. It should be noted that once a youth turns 18, he is able to purchase
both e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes legally.41 In states that have enacted an ecigarette MLSA law, youth who age out of the laws will therefore experience a decrease in the
relative cost of obtaining e-cigarettes, which could lead to an increase in e-cigarette use and a
decrease in smoking. However, if youth had turned to smoking when exposed to e-cigarette
MLSA laws, the accumulation of the addictive stock of nicotine may make it difficult to cut
down on smoking even when they are able to purchase e-cigarettes legally.
While effects on smoking are perhaps most highly indicated given the proximity
between e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes, the e-cigarette MLSA laws may also have
second-order effects on the use of other addictive substances. Many youth concurrently
smoke, drink, and use marijuana (Moss, Chen, and Yi 2014), and changes in tobacco
consumption can affect the marginal utility of consuming these other substances. A large
literature has explored this relationship between smoking, drinking, and marijuana use, based
on variation stemming from cigarette excise taxes, medical marijuana laws, minimum legal
drinking age, and other policies, though there still lacks a strong consensus in this literature

In most cases, youth aged 18 are old enough to legally purchase e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes except
for a few cases where states set the minimum age at 19 or 21.
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regarding whether these substances are economic substitutes or complements.42 Ultimately
the question of how e-cigarette MLSA laws impact smoking, drinking, and marijuana use cannot
be settled based on theory alone, and we bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue.

4. Data
Our analyses draw on the pooled national and state Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
System (YRBSS). The national YRBSS is conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the state YRBSS, while coordinated by CDC, is usually administered by
state health departments or education agencies. 43 Several studies note the advantages of using
such pooled data over the national YRBSS alone, and we think the pooled YRBSS is especially
well-suited for the analysis.44 For one thing, very few datasets have requisite sample sizes and
contain information on smoking and substance abuse patterns among adolescents over the
time period when e-cigarette restrictions have been unfolding. The pooled YRBSS is one of the
few that do, yielding sample sizes close to 800,000 person-year observations, which are 9 times
larger than the national YRBSS and 15 times the MTF. Moreover, the pooled YRBSS maximizes
the sample size for smaller states and thereby improves precision and state-trend controls.
Most importantly, the policy effects being estimated under our model specifications are
intention-to-treat (ITT) effects whose precision rely on sample sizes due to relatively low

See, for instance, Crost and Guerrero (2012), Crost and Rees (2013), Dee (1999), Farrelly et al. (2001), Gruber et
al. (2003), and Picone et al. (2004).
43 State identifiers are not provided in the national YRBSS by default, but we obtained these from the CDC and use
them in all analyses. We received the state-level data from either the CDC directly or from the states. Some states
do not distribute their data due to low response rates, and so we did not receive these data nor use them in the
analysis.
44 See, for instance, Carpenter and Cook (2008), Anderson et al. (2015), Sabia and Anderson (2016), and Hansen,
Sabia, and Rees (2017).
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prevalence rates of youth substance use (smoking in particular), and that ITT estimates capture
the average population effects. In that sense, large sample size will be necessary to reliably
detect potentially small ITT effects. Note that some of these policy effects (for instance, on
drinking or marijuana use) are third-order effects and would particularly benefit from large
samples; even if they are insignificant, it is important to precisely document these null effects.
The YRBSS is conducted biennially, and we utilize data from the most recent six waves
spanning 2005 through 2015. As the first set of states implemented e-cigarette MLSA laws in
2010, this ensures that our sample period includes a five-year pre-policy window at a
minimum.45 Although we have only three waves (5 years) of post-policy data given the biennial
structure of the YRBSS, there is sufficient variation in the observed exposure to e-cigarette
MLSA laws within states over time, which we exploit to identify the policy effects. Table 2.15
shows the states that are represented in the pooled YRBSS for each wave over the course of the
study, as well as the number of observations in each state by year cell. We follow prior studies
and use weights based on population, gender, race, and age at the state by year level retrieved
from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results Program for all
analyses (Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2015).46
The YRBSS data collection typically starts in March and ends in early June for each state.
Our policy indicator for the e-cigarette MLSA law is therefore set to turn on (equal one) if the
law has been effective by the end of February of the survey year and thereafter, and zero

We do not extend our sample to previous years in order to minimize introducing confounding trends and trend
breaks from periods prior to when e-cigarettes became available in the U.S. However, we note that our estimates
are robust to utilizing all waves of the YRBSS (1991-2015) or to starting the analyses in 2007, the year when ecigarettes entered the U.S. Results for these alternate sample periods are available from the authors upon request.
46 Results from regressions without weights are very similar and are available from the authors upon request.
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otherwise.47 A battery of questions relating to youth risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking,
and other substance use is consistently available in each wave of the YRBSS. We define
dichotomous indicators for past month participation in smoking, alcohol consumption, binge
drinking (consuming 5 or more drinks of alcohol in a row), and marijuana use. We also define
an indicator for smoking initiation based on youth current age and the age they reported
smoking a full cigarette for the first time; this indicator captures whether the respondent
initiated smoking in a given wave if their current age matches their reported age of smoking
onset.
To isolate the ceteris paribus relationship between e-cigarette MLSA laws and youth
substance use, we control for an extensive set of confounding policy shifts over this period:
federal and state cigarette excise taxes, state beer taxes, medical marijuana laws (MMLs),
marijuana decriminalization laws, state unemployment rates, and the natural logarithm of state
per capita income. To proxy for anti-smoking sentiment, we control for the presence of
comprehensive smoke-free air laws covering four venues: government and private worksites,
restaurants, and bars. We also account for anti-vaping sentiment by using an indicator variable
for whether vaping in private workplaces is restricted.48 We do not use e-cigarette taxes as a
control because only Minnesota has levied taxes on e-cigarettes over the study period. Lastly,
we control for a set of underage drinking regulations, ranging from zero-tolerance laws to laws

Following this logic, we code four states as having e-cigarette MLSA laws by 2011, nine additional states by 2013,
and 21 states in total (beyond the 13 previously) by 2015.
48 No partial bans on vaping in private workplaces exist. We have also experimented with including smoke-free air
laws in bars and restaurants to further control for state anti-smoking sentiment, which are highly collinear with
private workplace laws. Our estimate of the impact of e-cigarette MLSA laws was not materially affected by adding
these additional proxy variables for anti-smoking sentiment.
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related to alcohol possession, alcohol consumption, alcohol purchase, license suspension,
parties involving underage drinking, and keg registration, to account for the social norm against
underage drinking.49 Please see the Data Appendix for additional information on our control
variables.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all key variables over our study period, with
their means weighted by the total underage population. Columns 1, 2, 3 present means for the
full sample, and for youth under the age of 18, and for older youth respectively. While four
states (Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah) set the purchasing age of e-cigarettes at 19
years old, age in the YRBSS is top-coded at “18 or above” and we are unable to separate out
youth who are 19 years of age.50 As shown in Table 2.1, 17% of the sample are past-month
smokers, 20% are marijuana users, 39% are past-month drinkers, and 23% have participated in
binge drinking. The proportion of current smokers, drinkers, and marijuana users among those
who are 18 or above is expectedly and significantly higher than that among youth 17 or
younger. Questions related to youth e-cigarette use are first included in the YRBSS in 2015, and
using data from this wave, we find that 45% of high-school students have tried e-cigarettes in
their lifetime and 24% are current (past 30-day) e-cigarette users. The final two columns
present means of all variables during the pre-policy window, separately for states that have

The full set of underage drinking regulations is listed in the summary statistics table (Table 2.1), and we obtain all
the information from the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS).
50 This will result in some individuals “18 and above” being subject to e-cigarette MLSA laws, that is, some
individuals in the control group may be treated. We found that moving these youth into column 2 does not at all
change the means. Based on the 2016 American Community Survey, among current high-school enrollees
nationally between the ages of 12-19, only about 2% are 19, and only 4.3% (based on the share of the population
of the affected states, AK, AL, NJ and UT) of these 19-year olds would be misclassified as being not treated. Hence,
any attenuation bias from this misclassification is negligible. We show later that our results are not sensitive to
excluding these four states from the analyses.
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implemented e-cigarette MLSA laws at any time over the sample period (MLSA or treated
states) and states that have not yet (non-MLSA or control states). Baseline youth substance use
rates are slightly higher among the control states (by about 2-3 percentage points, or about
10%), though the differences are insignificant.

5. Empirical Approach
Our baseline model employs the standard difference-in-differences (DD) framework,
exploiting variation in the timing of policy change within states over time to identify the effects
of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth substance use behaviors. Specifically, we estimate the
following reduced-form demand function, relating substance use behaviors for youth 𝑖 residing
in state 𝑠 and surveyed at time 𝑡 directly to e-cigarette MLSA laws.
(1) 𝑃(𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 > 0) = ∑𝑖 Γ𝐗 i,s,t + b1 MLSAs,t + b2 Z𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡 [+𝜸𝑠 𝑡] [+𝜸𝑠 𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒 ] † 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 ,

where 𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is one of the four indicator outcome variables for the youth’s past month
substance use behavior. For instance, when 𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 indicates smoking, 𝑃(𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 > 0) denotes the
probability that the youth is a current smoker. Our key variable of interest, MLSAs,t , is an
indicator variable for whether state s had an e-cigarette MLSA law in place by the end of
February of the survey year and thereafter. The vector 𝐗 i,s,t contains a full set of youth
demographic characteristics and the vector 𝐙𝒔,𝒕 contains the time-varying state policy controls
(inflation-adjusted cigarette and beer taxes expressed in 2015 dollars, a set of indicator
variables for MMLs, restrictions on vaping in private workplaces and smoking in public places, a
set of indicator variables for underage drinking regulations, state unemployment rates, and the
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natural logarithm transformed state per capita income). All specifications include state and
year fixed effects, denoted by 𝜸𝑠 and 𝝀𝑡 , to account for the time-invariant state heterogeneity
and unobserved national trends. All specifications are estimated as linear probability models
via OLS.51 By convention, we cluster standard errors at the state level to account for correlated
errors across individuals and over time within each state (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
2004).
The parameter of interest b1 captures the average reduced-form effects of e-cigarette
MLSA laws on youth smoking, drinking, or marijuana use, including through all reinforcing
and/or competing pathways as discussed earlier. Identification of policy effects comes from
comparing changes in youth substance use rates within states that have implemented ecigarette MLSA laws to changes in states that have not yet done so. The DD estimates will yield
the causal effect if outcome trends for the control states (states that have not yet adopted ecigarette MLSA laws) are valid counterfactual to outcome trends for the treatment states
(those that have implemented the restrictions) in the absence of the policy (Colman and Dave
2015). We investigate this “parallel trends” assumption in Figure 2.1, generated using data
from the pooled YRBSS and weighted by the total underage population.
Figure 2.1 shows trends for youth smoking, drinking, binge drinking, and marijuana use
before and after the enactment of e-cigarette MLSA laws in the context of an unadjusted event
study design. The x-axis of the figure is the survey year relative to the year MLSA laws turned
on, so that year 0 represents the first year MLSA laws are coded as 1. For states that do have

Our results and conclusions are not materially affected if the specification is estimated via a logit or probit
regression.
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the laws by February 2015, we assign each a randomly selected pseudo-MLSA date by
respecting the true distribution of effective dates among the MLSA states, and then normalize
them to time zero. We use solid lines to track the mean substance use rates among the MLSA
states and dashed lines for the non-MLSA states. Table 2.11 shows that several states have
adopted MLSA laws over the sample period, and thus we generate Figure 2.1 by netting out
these state fixed effects.52 Figure 2.1 suggests a few things. Most apparently, the pre-policy
trends for all outcomes track each other closely between the MLSA and non-MLSA states,
providing visual evidence for the “parallel trends” assumption. We also statistically test for prepolicy differentials by regressing the outcome measure on an indicator for being the MLSA
states interacted with the linear pre-policy trends, controlling for a set of individual- and statelevel covariates listed in specification (1). This allows us to assess whether there exists any
remaining systematic differences in trends prior to policy exposure between the MLSA and nonMLSA states in a specification analogous to our main models. Table 2.12 reports the point
estimates for the interaction term, which suggest little evidence of differences in pre-policy
trends, consistent with Figure 2.1.
Second, we see clear trend breaks in youth smoking, drinking, and binge drinking around
the MLSA restrictions, suggesting positive behavioral responses to the policy, but little or no
break around the MLSA restrictions in youth marijuana use. Although these diverging trends
appear to point out the positive impacts of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth smoking and
drinking, many confounding factors have yet to be adjusted in Figure 2.1. In the analyses that

For scaling purposes, we added back the mean youth substance use rate across the whole sample to each
adjusted substance use rate (adjusted for state fixed effects). We also hold y-axis fixed for ease of comparison.
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follow, we take care to account for a multitude of confounders (vector 𝐙), and, in alternate
specifications, add state-specific linear time trends (denoted by 𝜸𝑠 𝑡) or state-specific pre-policy
linear trends (𝜸𝑠 𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒 )53 to allow for systematically different policy trends across the MLSA and
non-MLSA states and adjust for the less than perfect nature of the natural experiment.
We further extend the baseline specification in (1) in several ways to address some
other issues. First, to examine the dynamic impacts of the policy on youth substance use
behaviors and alternatively assess the “parallel trends” assumption between the MLSA and the
non-MLSA states after conditioning on covariates, we transform the specification in (1) into a
fully-specified event study design. In particular, we decompose MLSAs,t in (1) into a series of
policy “leads”, or “placebo” laws, and policy lags, which takes the form:
(2) 𝑃(𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 > 0) = ∑𝑖 Γ𝐗 i,s,t + 𝛂1 MLSAs,-2 + 𝛂2 MLSAs,0 + 𝛂3 MLSAs,1 + b2 Z𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡 [+𝜸𝑠 𝑡] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 ,

where all variables except MLSA are defined in the same way as in (1). For the full event of
MLSA, our reference (control) group indicates that the laws will not be turned on in another
survey year.54 The parameter 𝛂2 captures the contemporaneous policy effect on teen
substance use and 𝛂3 captures the lagged policy effect one or more survey years after the law’s
implementation. Hence, 𝛂1 provides evidence of parallel or differential pre-policy trends. If
this coefficient is statistically distinguishable from zero, it would suggest that the treatment and
control states had differential trends prior to policy adoption, which may undermine the

53

State-specific pre-trends are created by subtracting survey year from the year MLSA switched on. We use only
the negative values and set all the positive values to zero. We convert all the negative values to positive by
multiplying -1.
54 We use survey year instead of the calendar year to define event time in order to respect the biennial structure of
the YRBSS data. Our results are robust to using the calendar year in defining event time.
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interpretation of the DD effect as causal. Explicitly controlling for the lead effects as in the
event study design can also help to partly net out any non-parallel trends.
Next, we assess transitions into/out of smoking once youth are no longer subject to the
e-cigarette purchase restrictions. Specifically, we estimate the inter-temporal relation
associated with how being exposed to an e-cigarette MLSA law when the youth were underage
affects their smoking behaviors once they have aged out and are able to purchase e-cigarettes.
We do so by restricting the sample to those who are currently 18 or older and thus not subject
to the e-cigarette MLSA law, and then estimate the following specification:
(3) 𝑃(𝑆𝑚𝑘𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 > 0) = ∑𝑖 Γ𝐗 i,s,t + b1MLSA_Minor + b2 Z𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜸𝑠 + 𝝀𝑡 [+𝜸𝑠 𝑡] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡

Here, MLSA_Minor is an indicator for whether an e-cigarette MLSA law was effective in the
individual’s state of residence at any point in time when he was underage.55 For instance, an ecigarette MLSA law was effective on January 1st, 2013 in the state of New York. Therefore, a
youth aged 18 in 2014 from New York would have been exposed to the law in 2013.
Analogously, a youth aged 18 or 19 in 2015 would have also been exposed to the law two years
prior. Because age in the YRBSS is top-coded at 18, our strategy might erroneously subsume
someone aged 19 or 20 in the treatment group who are in fact not subject to the law in our
hypothetical examples. While this may possibly moderate the treatment effects, any
attenuation bias is likely to be small.56 We confirm this by dropping the four states where the

For states where no e-cigarette MLSA laws were enacted during the study period, this variable equals zero.
Among current high-school enrollees nationwide between the ages of 12-21, only about 2% are 19, and less than
1% are 20 or 21 (based on the 2015 American Community Survey). Thus, at most 3% of the sample who may be
untreated may be erroneously classified as being treated, and this would lead the treatment effect to be
understated by at most a factor of 3% (for instance, an estimated treatment effect of 2.9 percentage points when
the true treatment effect is 3 percentage points). This attenuation factor assumes that all 19-year olds are
55
56
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age limit of legally purchasing e-cigarettes is set at 19 and find that the results are virtually
unchanged. The parameter b1 captures how youth exposure to the e-cigarette purchase
restrictions, at any point in time when he was underage, affects his substance use behavior
once he has aged out of the restrictions.
We also build upon the above specifications and assess the margin at which smoking is
potentially affected. Specifically, we consider whether, and to what extent, e-cigarette MLSA
laws have impacted youth smoking initiation and take-up as well as their impacts on the other
sections of the smoking distribution besides the extensive margin focused on above. In
alternate specifications, we conduct additional checks to assess heterogeneous responses
across gender and grade. We also implement a falsification check, assessing effects of the ecigarette MLSA laws on youth who should not be constrained or affected by the policy.
Lastly, to check whether our estimates are driven by unobserved differential pre-policy
trends, we undertake a synthetic control design following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
(2010) to ensure that the treatment (MLSA) and control (non-MLSA) states shared common
pre-treatment trends in youth smoking and other substance use outcomes. We then follow the
approach developed by Donald and Lang (2007) and described in Bedard and Kuhn (2015) in
deriving synthetic DD estimates with multiple treatment assignments and compute standard
errors using the Donald and Lang’s two-step estimator. Note that this synthetic DD estimates
approach has appeared in several other studies (Choi, Dave, and Sabia 2016, Sabia, Swigert, and
Young 2017).

untreated, when most of them would have been treated if they lived in a state that had enacted an e-cigarette
MLSA law in the past; hence in practice the attenuation bias is likely to be even smaller.
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6. Results
6.1 Effects on Smoking
Table 2.2 presents estimates of the effects of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth smoking
participation among the underage adolescents. Panel A reports baseline effects from the
difference-in-differences (DD) model specified in Equation (1). Model 1 suggests a significant
1.1 percentage point (pp) increase in smoking participation among youth exposed to an ecigarette MLSA law, which translates to about 7 percent increase relative to the baseline means
for the control states. We introduce state-specific linear pre-policy trends in Model 2 to net out
any systematic differential trends in smoking across treatment and control states prior to the
enactment of the e-cigarette MLSA restrictions.57 The effect magnitude remains significant,
continuing to suggest about a 1 pp increase in smoking participation. The policy effect is also
robust to controlling for a full set of state-specific linear trends in Model 3, allowing the trends
to persist both pre- and post-policy enactment. State-specific time trends capture systematic
time-varying state heterogeneity and adjust for the potential endogeneity of the e-cigarette
MLSA restrictions. One possible limitation of using state-specific time trends is that it reduces
the amount of identifying variation (Neumark, Salas, and Wascher 2014). Furthermore, fitting
such state-specific linear trends may exacerbate bias, particularly for sample periods and prepolicy windows where trends in smoking (or other substance use) are far from linear. Wolfers
(2006) also cautions against adding state-specific linear trends in timing analyses where the
policy is modeled as pre-post implementation since such trends may confound both the state-

State-specific pre-trends allow only the pre-policy trends to differ and therefore attribute any potential break in
trends at 𝑡 = 0 to the policy.
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specific time-varying unobservable as well as any dynamic effects of the policy itself. We
therefore exercise care in using state-specific linear trends, though it is notable that adding
state-specific linear trends does not dilute the estimated effects. If anything, the point
estimates are slightly larger. The stability of estimates bolster the plausibility of our research
design.
Panel B decomposes the timing of the DD effects and presents estimates from a formal
event study design as specified in Equation (2). In keeping with the biennial sampling scheme
of the YRBSS, these models control for indicators for the full year of policy enactment, one or
more survey years post-policy enactment, one survey year before enactment (reference
category) and two or more survey years before enactment. The results from the event study
design underscore three points. First, e-cigarette MLSA laws appear to have a significant
“contemporaneous” effect during the full year of enactment, about 1.4 pp on average. Owing
to the biennial sampling frame of the YRBSS and data collection typically starting in March of a
given year, the enactment year indicator is defined such that it turns on if the policy took effect
anytime since March of the previous survey year and February of the current year.58 This
suggests that the policy could be active for over 12 months, picking up some lag in the policy
effect but only for up to 2 years. Second, as the lag increases, there is some suggestive
evidence that the response to policy becomes larger, on the order of 2-3 pp across all models,
though estimates in models with the state pre-policy trends are not significant. This possible
compounding of the policy effects over time is consistent with an interactive age response.

For instance, for respondents interviewed in the 2013 YRBSS, the enactment indicator would equal 1 in 2013 if
the state they lived in adopted the policy anytime between March 2011 and February 2013.
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Smoking participation generally increases with age among adolescents; current smoking
participation among 16-year-olds is 10.2% compared to 5.0% among 14-year-olds. Hence, an ecigarette MLSA law in effect when the adolescent was for instance 14 years of age would be
expected to have a stronger “bite” as he ages and becomes more likely to contemplate smoking
(or use other forms of tobacco) in the future. Third, the lead effects are small in magnitude and
insignificant, providing validation to the research design and confirming that the policy is
orthogonal to pre-adoption trends in smoking.
While our conceptual framework is agnostic about the direction of the effects given the
potential for cigarette smoking to either substitute or complement e-cigarette use, the pattern
of results that we find – suggesting an increase in smoking participation – is ex post validating
when contrasted with the breaking trends in youth smoking around the MLSA restrictions. As
shown in Figure 2.1, pre-policy trends suggest a decrease in youth smoking as e-cigarettes
entered the market in 2007 and e-cigarette MLSA laws proliferated across states (starting in
2010). Thus, if our models are simply reflecting this decline in smoking as states enacted more
e-cigarette MLSA laws, then the DD effects would have suggested (possibly spuriously) a
deterrent effect of the laws on youth smoking. However, finding increases in smoking from the
policy, despite the declining pre-policy trends, adds confidence that these estimates are not
just reflecting the falling smoking rates.
Together, estimates in Table 2.2 suggest that when faced with e-cigarette MLSA laws,
underage youth are more likely to turn to cigarette smoking. This may prima facie seem
counter-intuitive since they are also restricted from purchasing cigarettes; hence, it would
appear that underage youth are turning from one restricted substance to another. However,
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since all youth face purchasing restrictions for cigarettes over the sample period, the
implementation of e-cigarette MLSA laws would increase the relative costs of accessing ecigarettes (relative to cigarettes), affecting the demand for these substances. Because
cigarettes have been in the market for a long time, most youth who smoke may have found
alternative ways to bypass the purchase restrictions and obtain their cigarettes through
secondary sources, such as “bumming” or borrowing from a friend or adult (Katzman,
Markowitz, and McGeary 2007, Hansen, Rees, and Sabia 2013).59 Thus, it is conceivable that
these youth are increasing their participation in the secondary cigarette market when
purchasing e-cigarettes is prohibited. The secondary market for e-cigarettes, however, may be
less well-developed, particularly when recent estimates suggest that only 3.7% of adults vape
(Schoenborn and Gindi 2015), thus reducing a source of e-cigarettes for teenagers in secondary
markets.60
The smoking participation margin among adolescents in Table 2.2, columns 1-3
combines first-time smoking, smoking experimentation, regular or heavy smoking, and use of
multiple tobacco products. Most smokers initiate smoking in their teens, and hence the
initiation margin is the most salient for adolescents and also very relevant from a policy stance
since it may determine future transitions and paths to nicotine dependence. Models 4-6 in
Table 2.2 specifically look at how exposure to an e-cigarette MLSA law affects smoking

A dollar increase in cigarette taxes is estimated to decrease the probability of youth getting cigarettes through a
secondary market by 5 or 6 percent, but cigarette taxes had little impact on youth obtaining cigarettes through
borrowing or taking from a store or family member. This may suggest that they have alternative ways to bypass
the rising costs of cigarettes.
60 See https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db217.htm. Furthermore, while it may be relatively easier
for a youth to borrow or “bum” a combustible cigarette from a friend or adult, which by definition is disposed after
use, the long-lasting properties of e-cigarettes (e.g. even one disposable e-cigarette can last up to 400 puffs or
equivalent to one pack of cigarettes) makes it more difficult to borrow or bum from another user.
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initiation. For these analyses, we restrict the sample to youth who have initiated smoking in
the given survey year or are non-smokers; thus youth who are current smokers but had
initiated smoking habits in the past are excluded. As noted earlier, we define youth as a firsttime smoker if his age at the time of interview matches the reported age when he first tried
smoking. These results should be interpreted with care since smoking initiation in the YRBSS is
likely coupled with recall errors in the reported age at which smoking was initiated as well as
the mismatch between age and survey year.61 These estimates nevertheless suggest that
exposure to an e-cigarette MLSA law significantly increases the probability of initiating smoking,
on the order of 0.7 pp. The event study design in Panel B also suggest similar magnitudes
during the full year of enactment (0.7 pp, capturing significant effects within 12 months of
enactment and possibly up to 24 months of enactment, as noted above) and some positive
effects thereafter, though these lagged effects are not statistically significant. The magnitudes
for smoking initiation represent a little over half of the smoking participation effect identified in
models 1-3. Thus, the caveats regarding measurement error notwithstanding, which is likely to
bias the initiation effect downward, it appears that some of the positive effects of e-cigarette
MLSA laws on smoking participation among underage youth may reflect an increase in smoking
initiation and remainder reflects movement across smoking and vaping in former initiates.62

For instance, a 15-year-old surveyed in 2013 who reported that they initiated smoking at age 15 would be coded
as having initiated smoking in 2013. However, the youth may have initiated smoking in 2012 while still 15 years of
age.
62 It should be noted that adolescents aged 14-17 who are current smokers are likely to have initiated very
recently; hence, any change in the smoking margin for this age group may still reflect initiation, experimentation,
and trying out different substances.
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In Table 2.3, we assess the distributional effects of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth
smoking, but, in the interest of space, we focus on the policy effects on the upper tail of the
smoking distribution.63 Following Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal (2016), we define youth as a
regular smoker if he smoked cigarettes 20 or more days in the past month and a heavy smoker
if he smoked cigarettes every day. Table 2.3, mirroring Table 2.2, reports estimates using the
specification in (1) (Panel A) and estimates using a fully adjusted event-study design (Panel B).
Turning to Panel A, we find that youth exposed to the e-cigarette MLSA restrictions are 0.8 pp,
or 18 percent relative to the baseline means, more likely to be regular and heavy smokers. In
Panel B, we find that the law’s impact continues to be larger in the lagged period than the
“contemporaneous” period. While these results are not statistically significant across model
specifications, they are economically significant in magnitude. In earlier analyses (Panel A,
columns 1-3 of Table 2.2), we find that e-cigarette MLSA laws increased youth smoking
participation by about 7 percent and; in comparison, results here suggest that youth increased
regular or heavy cigarettes smoking by 18%, suggesting greater effects along the “intensive”
margin when exposed to the e-cigarette MLSA laws.
In Table 2.4, we evaluate whether the increase in smoking persists after youth are no
longer constrained by the e-cigarette purchasing restrictions. Thus, we estimate specification
(3) for youth, 18 and above, who have aged out of the e-cigarette MLSA laws. Since age in the
YRBSS is top-coded as 18 or above and four states (AL, AK, NJ, and UT) set the age for legally
purchasing e-cigarettes at 19, our sample may still include a few who are not old enough to buy

Results for the MLSA treatment effects on the remaining part of the distribution are very similar to what is
reported in Table 2.3 below and are available from the authors upon request.
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e-cigarettes. We therefore present models for all states (models 1-3) and after excluding these
four states (models 4-6). We discuss here the latter set of models that bypass the potential
misclassification, though estimates remain virtually identical whether we include or exclude the
states that had set the e-cigarette MLSA at age 19.
There is little evidence from Table 2.4 to suggest that exposure to an e-cigarette MLSA
law when underage is associated with increased smoking behaviors when he has aged out.
Hence, we do not find any strong evidence that the increase in smoking persists as youth age
out of e-cigarette MLSA laws. These models suggest that any effects on underage smoking,
among youth exposed to an e-cigarette MLSA law, fade when they aged out of the law and are
able to purchase e-cigarettes legally.64

6.2. Magnitude of the Smoking Effect
Our estimates thus far suggest that when faced with e-cigarette MLSA laws, underage
youth are more likely to turn to cigarette smoking, at least until they age out of these laws.
Results in Table 2.2 suggest about a 1.3 pp increase in smoking post-policy adoption, which is
consistent with findings reported by Friedman (2015) and Pesko et al. (2016). 65 To place this
magnitude in context, it should be noted that the DD effect we estimate is an intention-to-treat
(ITT) effect since our sample includes youth that do not use e-cigarettes. It is unlikely that e-

Most smokers initiate smoking during adolescence, with 16 years of age being the mode among ever-smokers
(based on data from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health). Hence, accumulation of the addictive
smoking stock is still relatively low.
65 Both studies find about a 1 pp increase in smoking among underage youth, based on data up to 2013. Our
slightly larger estimate (up to 1.5 pp in some model specifications) reflect two additional years of data (YRBSS
spanning up to 2015) in conjunction with some evidence that the lagged policy response are slightly larger over
time.
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cigarette MLSA laws would have a direct effect on smoking behaviors, independent of their
effect on e-cigarette use. If e-cigarette MLSA laws had no effect on e-cigarette use, we should
expect no effects on other substance use behaviors as well.
Hence, establishing the first-stage effect of how e-cigarette MLSA laws may have
impacted youth e-cigarette use can help frame what the maximal effect should be for spillover
responses into smoking (and other substance use) given that these individuals represent the
affected group. However, estimating effects on e-cigarette use due to these policies has been a
challenge because of data limitations; youth-based surveys, including the YRBSS and the MTF,
have only started asking respondents if they use e-cigarettes in 2014 or 2015. Abouk and
Adams (2017), for instance, estimate that the e-cigarette MLSA law is associated with a
significant 10 pp decline in e-cigarette use among high school seniors in 2014, based on crosssectional evidence from the 2014 MTF wave.
The YRBSS started fielding questions on e-cigarette use in the latest 2015 wave. For
suggestive evidence, we estimate a similar specification to that in (1) for outcomes related to ecigarette use (ever use and current use) based only on the 2015 YRBSS. 66 Table 2.5 suggests
that, among underage youth, e-cigarette MLSA laws reduced current use by about 1 pp (5%
decline relative to the baseline mean of 21% vaping participation), and ever use (as a proxy for
initiation) by about 4.3 pp (10% decline relative to the baseline mean of 44% ever vaping).
Similar to Abouk and Adams (2017), the effects (not shown) are somewhat larger for older

Given the single wave of data, we are not able to control for state fixed effects, and year fixed effects are not
necessary. Instead, we include census division fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity at this
geographic level. Models are saturated with all other state-level policy controls.
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adolescents (11th and 12th graders). We previously found evidence that the laws increased
youth smoking by about 1.3 pp, and so we calculate a back-of-the-envelope treatment-on-thetreated (TOT) effect of 0.3 using the law’s impact on ever vaping. We use ever vaping for this
calculation to better match the longer duration of data available for smoking. In other words,
about 3 in every 10 youth may have increased their smoking as they reduced e-cigarette use in
response to the e-cigarette MLSA restrictions. These estimates should be interpreted with
considerable caution and are meant to be suggestive due to the inherent difficulties in
obtaining the first-stage effect of the laws on e-cigarette use with only a single wave of data.
Nevertheless, they can prove useful in gauging the credibility of the magnitudes on the secondorder effects.

6.3. Effects on Drinking and Marijuana Use
Next we examine whether exposure to e-cigarette MLSA laws has any spillover effects
on other substance use behaviors among underage youth. In Table 2.6, baseline DD estimates
and dynamic effects from the event study are presented separately for past month drinking and
binge drinking, showing little evidence of any consistent effect on alcohol use. Though Figure
2.1 suggests that e-cigarette MLSA laws may have increased youth drinking and binge drinking,
the estimated policy impacts turn out to be sensitive to model specifications and are never
statistically distinguishable from zero. For example, there is some suggestive evidence of a
lagged increase in drinking (on the order of about 0.7-1.4 pp, or 2-4% relative to the baseline
mean) in the event study specifications (models 2 and 3). But, standard errors are large and we
cannot reject the null. Table 2.7 presents estimates of the effect of e-cigarette MLSA laws on
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past month marijuana use, and here we do not find any statistically significant effects. We note
that the e-cigarette MLSA effects on substances other than tobacco are third-order effects, and
so it is unsurprising that they are quite weak. Hence, while our results suggest that restricting
the purchase of e-cigarettes among underage youth may have spilled over into higher smoking,
we find little evidence of additional substitution into drinking or marijuana use.

6.4. Results from Alternative Samples
Of concern that our DD estimates may not be consistent due to the unbalanced nature
of the YRBSS, we re-run specification (1) using a strongly balanced sample (i.e. states without
gaps in data collection) shown in Table 2.16, and report the estimated policy effects on youth
cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and marijuana use in Table 2.13. It is validating that all
our estimates are not sensitive across analysis samples and are highly similar in terms of
magnitudes and significance. For instance, we continue to find that the enactment of ecigarette MLSA laws is associated with a 1-1.7 pp increase in youth smoking participation, a 0.60.8 pp increase in smoking initiation, and a 0.8-1.1 pp increase in regular and heavy smoking.
As above, we find little effects of e-cigarette MLSA laws on youth drinking, binge drinking, and
marijuana use.
We also re-run the specification in (1) using only the state YRBSS that are representative
of the sampled states. The estimated MLSA treatment effects on youth smoking, drinking, and
marijuana use (not reported but are available from the authors upon request) are consistent in
magnitude with findings from the full sample; however, due to lower sample size statistical

90

power is attenuated somewhat. The conclusion that e-cigarette MLSA laws increase youth
smoking behaviors remains unchanged when using only the state YRBSS data.

6.5 Results from the Synthetic Control Method
As the last set of robustness checks, we undertake a synthetic control design following
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) to ensure that the treatment (MLSA) and control
(non-MLSA) states shared common pre-treatment trends in youth smoking and other substance
use outcomes. A detailed explanation of synthetic control method (SCM) is outside the scope
of this study, but its essence can be viewed as follows: information on youth substance use in a
few pre-policy periods coupled with the means of state-level covariates (Table 2.1) across the
entire pre-policy period are utilized to form a “best” linear combination of control states in
which e-cigarette MLSA laws have not been implemented over the study period (2005-2015).
The algorithm underlying this method assigns weight to each donor (non-MLSA) state so that
any pre-treatment differences in outcomes and state-level covariates between the treatment
and the synthetically matched state are minimized. Hence, by expressly forcing the e-cigarette
MLSA counterfactuals to have more similar pre-treatment trends, SCM raises the likelihood of
satisfying the “parallel trends” assumption (Sabia, Swigert, and Young 2017).
Building on this logic, we run SCM on each MLSA state by excluding all the other MLSA
states from the estimation sample, and iterate this process for youth cigarette smoking, alcohol
consumption, binge drinking, and marijuana use. For each substance use outcome, we then
pool the individually created synthetic samples and form one larger SCM-weighted sample,
keeping the synthetic weights unchanged. Following the approach developed by Donald and
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Lang (2007) and described in Bedard and Kuhn (2015), we derive the synthetic DD estimates
with multiple treatment assignments and compute standard errors using Donald and Lang’s
two-step estimator. In the interest of space, we present three graphs generated using an
event-study design analogous to those in Figure 2.1 but using the synthetically weighted
sample.67
Figure 2.2 presents visual analyses for youth smoking, drinking, binge drinking, and
marijuana use. Like in Figure 2.1, we use solid lines to denote MLSA states and dashed lines for
their synthetically matched states, with the vertical dashed lines representing the year ecigarette MLSA laws turned on. Unlike in Figure 2.1, we perform SCM on an extended sample
period (1999-2015) to allow for a better match of the pre-policy trends. All four figures show
that the treatment and synthetic control states have overlaid trends in the pre-policy periods,
with clear divergence since the policy enactment.
Table 2.14 reports the estimates of policy effects using the pooled synthetically
weighted sample and inferential statistics based on Donald and Lang’s two-step estimator.
Similar to the baseline DD estimates, we find a significant increase in smoking among underage
youth exposed to the e-cigarette MLSA laws and no effects on the use of other substances. The
point estimate of a 1 pp increase in youth smoking remains robust and is similar in magnitude
to that from our standard DD models (Panel A, column1 of Table 2.2). The weight of the
evidence across a battery of checks and alternate model specifications, in conjunction with the

The resulting trends for youth cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and marijuana use in each MLSA state
and its synthetically matched states are available from the authors upon request.
67
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synthetic control estimates, give us confidence that the policy effects are not confounded by
differential pre-policy trends.

6.6. Placebo Checks and Heterogeneous Effects
Given that e-cigarette MLSA laws are by definition binding only for underage youth, this
presents a natural falsification test. The policy should have no causal effect on any addictive
behaviors among youth who have aged out and were not exposed to the policy while underage.
That is, even if a state enacted an e-cigarette MLSA law of 18 in 2010, youth aged 18 or older in
2010 (19 years of age or older in 2011; etc.) should not be affected since they were never
exposed to the restriction even when they were underage. Table 2.8 carries out this
falsification test for each specification and substance use outcome, defining the sample as
youth that have aged out of e-cigarette MLSA laws and were never exposed while underage.
All estimates, most notably for smoking participation, which earlier models suggested a
significant effect among affected underage youth, are statistically insignificant and generally
small in magnitude relative to the baseline means.
In Tables 9 and 10, we assess whether the response in smoking behaviors is different
across gender and grade in school. Models 1-3 in Table 2.9 present estimates of being exposed
to an e-cigarette MLSA law on smoking participation among underage boys, and Models 4-6
present estimates for underage girls. We find that most of the positive effects on smoking is
being driven by boys; specifically, these models suggest a significant 1.3 to 2 pp increase in
smoking participation among boys who are exposed to an e-cigarette MLSA law, which
translates to about a 10% increase relative to their baseline means. Use of e-cigarettes and
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conventional cigarettes is significantly lower among adolescent girls relative to boys, and hence
it is not altogether surprising that the policy effects are substantially larger among boys.
Models in Table 2.10 present differential effects across 9th and 10th graders vs. 11th and 12th
graders. We generally find significant and positive effects of the e-cigarette MLSA restrictions
on smoking participation for both groups. The event study analyses with state trends are
somewhat suggestive of a slightly larger response among the older adolescents relative to the
younger adolescents. However, standard errors are relatively large, and we are not able to
reject the null that these effects are similar across both groups.

7. Conclusion:
Economic theory suggests that e-cigarette MLSA laws may reduce e-cigarette use, and
we find suggestive evidence of this using a single cross-section of data. Using MTF data, Abouk
and Adams (2017) reached a similar conclusion. We also find strong evidence that e-cigarette
MLSA laws increased the probability of youth smoking conventional cigarettes by
approximately 1.1 pp (7% relative to the mean smoking rates). In particular, youth who have
not smoked in the past but initiated their first cigarettes due to the e-cigarette MLSA
restrictions may have contributed to a little over half of the increase in smoking participation.
Our estimates of the policy effects on youth smoking are slightly larger than those of Friedman
(2015) and Pesko et al. (2016), who both found that the laws increased smoking participation
by roughly 0.9 pp. Our slightly larger estimates reflect two additional waves of data in
conjunction with some evidence of a stronger lagged policy response. However, our finding
that e-cigarette MLSA laws increased cigarette use contrasts from findings by Abouk and Adams
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(2017) who suggested that the laws decreased smoking among underage seniors (but not
among other underage youth). Given that both our study and Abouk and Adams (2017) use
individual-level data, this alone does not appear to account for the differences in results. Our
study employs one additional year of data and utilizes data from the pooled YRBSS which yields
a sample size approximately 14 times that of the MTF sample employed by Abouk and Adams
(2017). Restricting our analyses to the same periods as their study does not alter our results or
conclusions. Hence, it is possible that differences between the MTF and the YRBSS sampling
schemes and their respective sample sizes may underlie some of the differences in our results.
While it has been argued that the YRBSS may be more representative at the state level
(Carpenter and Cook 2008), and hence may provide more stable estimates of changes in
smoking within states over time, further research exploring these differences is warranted.
Our models also suggest that the increase in youth smoking caused by e-cigarette MLSA
laws appears to fade once youth age out of the law. Additionally, we do not find any evidence
that the laws affect the use of other addictive substances such as alcohol or marijuana use.
While federal regulations require all states to have a cigarette MLSA law of at least 18,
some states have made the age limit for purchasing both cigarettes and e-cigarettes higher. As
of the 1st quarter of 2018, three states had an MLSA law of 19 and five states (California, D.C.,
Hawaii, New Jersey, and Oregon) had MLSA laws of 21. Our results suggest some caution in
raising MLSA laws for both cigarettes and e-cigarettes to 21. It may be preferable to raise
cigarette MLSA laws to 21, but maintain e-cigarette MLSA laws at 18 to encourage youth to quit
smoking using e-cigarettes. Preventing youth from legally buying e-cigarettes until age 21 may
harden preferences for cigarettes and make quitting at that age more difficult.
95

In sum, it is unclear from our results if e-cigarette MLSA laws have a positive impact on
public health. It appears that some portion of the decrease in e-cigarette use, about 30% based
on crude TOT estimates, may come at the cost of higher conventional cigarette use, at least in
the short-term until the youth has aged out of the restrictions. If e-cigarettes are only 5% as
harmful as traditional cigarettes (Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians
2016), then e-cigarette MLSA laws leading to increased smoking may cause greater harm than
benefits. However, such net costs need to be balanced against other considerations such as the
potential use of e-cigarettes for smoking cessation among older youth and among longer-term
smokers.
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Table 2.1 — Summary Statistics of Key Response Variables, Individual Demographic Characteristics, and State-level Policy Controls
Full Sample

Youth
younger than
18

Youth
18 or older

States with E-Cig
MLSA Laws; Prepolicy periods

States without ECig MLSA Laws;
Pre-policy periods

Current smoker

0.17 [0.37]

0.15 [0.36]

0.25 [0.43]

0.18 [0.39]

0.20 [0.41]

Current drinker

0.39 [0.49]

0.36 [0.48]

0.51 [0.50]

0.41 [0.49]

0.43 [0.50]

Current binge drinker

0.23 [0.42]

0.22 [0.41]

0.35 [0.48]

0.25 [0.43]

0.28 [0.45]

Current marijuana user

0.20 [0.40]

0.19 [0.39]

0.26 [0.44]

0.20 [0.40]

0.20 [0.40]

Female

0.51 [0.50]

0.52 [0.50]

0.46 [0.50]

0.51 [0.50]

0.51 [0.50]

White

0.56 [0.50]

0.56 [0.50]

0.56 [0.60]

0.56 [0.50]

0.58 [0.49]

Black

0.14 [0.35]

0.14 [0.35]

0.15 [0.36]

0.16 [0.37]

0.08 [0.26]

Hispanics

0.16 [0.37]

0.16 [0.37]

0.16 [0.36]

0.16 [0.37]

0.18 [0.39]

Other races

0.14 [0.34]

0.14 [0.34]

0.13 [0.33]

0.11 [0.32]

0.16 [0.37]

9th grade

0.28 [0.45]

0.31 [0.46]

0.01 [0.08]

0.28 [0.45]

0.28 [0.45]

10th grade

0.27 [0.44]

0.30 [0.46]

0.01 [0.11]

0.27 [0.44]

0.27 [0.44]

11th grade

0.25 [0.43]

0.27 [0.44]

0.10 [0.30]

0.25 [0.43]

0.24 [0.43]

12th grade

0.21 [0.41]

0.12 [0.33]

0.88 [0.32]

0.20 [0.40]

0.21 [0.41]

E-cigarette MLSA Laws

0.24 [0.43]

0.27 [0.44]

0.01 [0.11]

0.00 [0.00]

0.00 [0.00]

Real cigarette taxes

2.35 [1.18]

2.37 [1.19]

2.21 [1.11]

2.00 [1.20]

2.22 [0.72]

Comprehensive smoke-free air laws

0.41 [0.49]

0.42 [0.49]

0.34 [0.47]

0.34 [0.47]

0.24 [0.43]

Youth substance use

Youth demographic characteristics

Merged state-level covariates
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Bans on e-cigarette use in private work places

0.01 [0.09]

0.01 [0.09]

0.01 [0.10]

0.00 [0.00]

0.00 [0.00]

Real beer taxes

0.27 [0.24]

0.27 [0.24]

0.29 [0.25]

0.32 [0.27]

0.24 [0.13]

Zero-tolerance law

0.41 [0.49]

0.41 [0.49]

0.41 [0.49]

0.22 [0.41]

0.77 [0.42]

Underage drinking: No possession of alcohol

0.15 [0.36]

0.16 [0.37]

0.10 [0.29]

0.05 [0.23]

0.10 [0.30]

Underage drinking: No consumption of alcohol

0.08 [0.27]

0.08 [0.27]

0.07 [0.25]

0.11 [0.31]

0.02 [0.12]

Underage drinking: No internal consumption of alcohol

0.18 [0.38]

0.18 [0.39]

0.13 [0.34]

0.12 [0.32]

0.00 [0.00]

Underage drinking: No purchase of alcohol

0.21 [0.41]

0.21 [0.40]

0.25 [0.43]

0.31 [0.46]

0.09 [0.28]

Underage drinking: Suspense or revoke driving privileges

0.36 [0.48]

0.36 [0.48]

0.33 [0.47]

0.35 [0.48]

0.13 [0.33]

Underage drinking: Against underage drinking party

0.14 [0.34]

0.13 [0.34]

0.15 [0.36]

0.13 [0.34]

0.11 [0.31]

Underage drinking: Keg registration law

0.21 [0.40]

0.21 [0.41]

0.20 [0.40]

0.21 [0.41]

0.12 [0.32]

Medical Marijuana Laws

0.26 [0.44]

0.26 [0.44]

0.22 [0.41]

0.09 [0.28]

0.26 [0.44]

Medical Marijuana Laws: home cultivation

0.12 [0.33]

0.12 [0.33]

0.13 [0.33]

0.07 [0.25]

0.16 [0.36]

Medical Marijuana Laws: legal dispensary

0.12 [0.33]

0.12 [0.33]

0.13 [0.33]

0.06 [0.25]

0.10 [0.30]

Medical marijuana Laws: non-specific pains

0.19 [0.40]

0.20 [0.40]

0.16 [0.37]

0.08 [0.27]

0.17 [0.38]

Medical Marijuana Laws: registry

0.15 [0.36]

0.15 [0.36]

0.11 [0.31]

0.03 [0.18]

0.11 [0.32]

Marijuana decriminalization law

0.37 [0.48]

0.38 [0.49]

0.31 [0.46]

0.40 [0.49]

0.10 [0.30]

State unemployment rates

6.66 [2.00]

6.65 [1.99]

6.80 [2.06]

6.82 [2.20]

6.78 [2.15]

Natural logarithm of state per capita personal income

10.65 [0.18]

10.66 [0.18]

10.62 [0.17]

10.59 [0.15]

10.53 [0.12]

Notes: Means and standard deviation (in bracket) are reported. The statistics are weighted by the total underage population at the state by year level obtained
from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results Program.
Definitions of youth substance use are defined in the text.
E-cigarette MLSA laws and cigarette excise taxes come from CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System.
State-level policies related to underage drinking come from Alcohol Policy Information System.
State unemployment rates and per capita personal income come from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Comprehensive smoke-free air laws consist of four venues: government and private workplaces, restaurants, and bars.
Cigarette and beer taxes are inflation-adjusted to 2015 dollars using CPI-U.
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Table 2.2 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Smoking: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
Panel A
E-cigarette MLSA Law

DV: Youth is a current smoker
1
2
3

DV: Youth is a first-time smoker
4
5
6

0.011***
(0.004)

0.012**
(0.005)

0.015***
(0.004)

0.007**
(0.003)

0.007*
(0.004)

0.007**
(0.003)

1

2

3

4

5

6

-0.006
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.008)

-0.006
(0.004)

-0.002
(0.003)

-0.000
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.003)

–

–

–

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

0.010***
(0.004)

0.015
(0.009)

0.018***
(0.005)

0.007**
(0.003)

0.007*
(0.004)

0.008**
(0.003)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

0.020***
(0.005)

0.026
(0.016)

0.022**
(0.011)

0.006
(0.005)

0.005
(0.014)

0.009
(0.014)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Panel B
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre
E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

0.15

0.15

✓
0.15

752,332

752,332

752,332

0.09

0.09

✓
0.09

551,232

551,232

551,232

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
In columns 1-3, we define youth as current smokers if any days of smoking over the past month are reported. The analysis sample there is restricted to youth younger than 18.
In columns 4-6, we define youth as first-time smokers if their age at the time of the survey matches the age of first-time smoking.
Youth who never smoke a cigarette are coded zero and youth who initiated smoking prior to the survey are excluded.
Youth younger than 13 or older than 17 are dropped as they cannot be first-time smokers when exposed to an e-cigarette MLSA law.
E-cigarette MLSA law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text. One wave means one survey year.
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Table 2.3 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Smoking at Different Margins: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
Panel A
E-cigarette MLSA Law

DV: Youth is a regular smoker
1
2
3

DV: Youth is a heavy smoker
4
5
6

0.007**
(0.003)

0.010**
(0.005)

0.008**
(0.003)

0.008***
(0.003)

0.010**
(0.004)

0.009***
(0.003)

1

2

3

4

5

6

-0.005
(0.003)

-0.005
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.002)

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.002
(0.003)

–

–

–

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

0.007**
(0.003)

0.012*
(0.006)

0.010**
(0.005)

0.007***
(0.002)

0.011**
(0.005)

0.010***
(0.004)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

0.025***
(0.004)

0.011
(0.009)

0.019
(0.012)

0.022***
(0.003)

0.010
(0.007)

0.016*
(0.010)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Panel B
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre
E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

✓

✓

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.04

0.04

0.04

752,332

752,332

752,332

752,332

752,332

752,332

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
In columns 1-3, we define youth as regular smokers if they smoked cigarettes at least 20 days over the past month.
In columns 4-6, we define youth as heavy smokers if they smoked cigarettes every day over the past month.
The analysis sample is restricted to youth younger than 18.
E-cigarette MLSA law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text. One wave means one survey year.

100

Table 2.4 — The Intertemporal Relationship Between E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Smoking: National and State YRBSS: 20052015
DV: Youth is a current smoker
Exposed to E-cigarette MLSA Law While
Underage

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends
Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.002
(0.013)

0.005
(0.015)

0.010
(0.014)

0.001
(0.014)

0.006
(0.016)

0.009
(0.015)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

0.24
93,716

0.24
93,716

✓
0.24
93,716

0.24
93,716

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
The analysis sample is restricted to youth aged 18 or above.
In columns 1-3, we include Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah, where the age limits of purchasing e-cigarettes are set at 19.
In columns 4-6, we exclude Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah.
The definition of the key regressor, "Exposed to E-cigarette MLSA Law While Underage," is in the text.
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0.24
93,716

✓
0.24
93,716

Table 2.5 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth E-cigarette Use: National and State YRBSS: 2015
Ever Used E-cigarettes

Current Vapor

-0.043***
(0.015)

-0.009
(0.015)

0.44
Yes
Yes

0.21
Yes
Yes

145,950

178,444

E-cigarette MLSA Law

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Full controls
Census Division FEs
Observations
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01
Both models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels.
State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are also included.
Youth aged 18 or above are excluded.
E-cigarette MLSA law is defined in the text.
We define youth as a current vapor if any day of e-cigarette use is reported in the past month.
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Table 2.6 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Alcohol Use: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
Panel A
E-cigarette MLSA Law

DV: Youth is a current drinker
1
2
3

DV: Youth is a current binge drinker
4
5
6

-0.001
(0.008)
1

0.005
(0.009)
2

0.010
(0.009)
3

0.001
(0.006)
4

-0.002
(0.005)
5

0.000
(0.005)
6

-0.003
(0.006)

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.008
(0.007)

-0.002
(0.005)

0.004
(0.009)

0.001
(0.005)

–

–

–

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

-0.001
(0.008)

0.011
(0.011)

0.013
(0.008)

0.001
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.006)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

-0.010
(0.009)

0.007
(0.013)

0.014
(0.014)

0.009
(0.008)

-0.014
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.012)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Panel B
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre
E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends
Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

0.35

0.35

✓
0.35

711,220

711,220

711,220

0.21

0.21

✓
0.21

711,220

711,220

711,220

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
In columns 1-3, we define youth as current drinker if any days of drinking over the past month are reported.
In columns 4-6, we define youth as current binge drinker if any days of binge drinking (drank 5 or more drinks of alcohol in a row within a couple of hours) over
the past month are reported.
The analysis sample is restricted to youth younger than 18.
E-cigarette MLSA Law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text. One wave means one survey year.
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Table 2.7 – E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Marijuana Use: National and State YRBSS: 20052015
Panel A
DV: Youth is a current marijuana user

1

2

3

-0.000
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.009)

1

2

3

-0.010
(0.006)

-0.006
(0.010)

-0.012
(0.009)

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

-0.001
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.012)

0.002
(0.010)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

0.008
(0.007)

0.017
(0.011)

0.015
(0.017)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

E-cigarette MLSA Law

Panel B
DV: Youth is a current marijuana user
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre

E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends
Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

0.20

0.20

✓
0.20

760,063

760,063

760,063

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1
are included.
We define youth as current marijuana users if any days of marijuana use over the past month are reported.
The analysis sample is restricted to youth younger than 18.
E-cigarette MLSA Law is defined in the text.
One wave means one survey year.
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Table 2.8 — Falsification Tests: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
Panel A
DV: Youth is a current smoker

1

2

3

E-cigarette MLSA Law

0.012
(0.013)

-0.006
(0.011)

-0.001
(0.014)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
N
Panel B
DV: Youth is a current drinker

0.23
93,716

0.23
93,716

0.23
93,716

1

2

3

E-cigarette MLSA Law

-0.008
(0.018)

-0.011
(0.024)

-0.013
(0.019)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
N
Panel C
DV: Youth is a current binge drinker

0.47
88,992

0.47
88,992

0.47
88,992

1

2

3

E-cigarette MLSA Law

-0.009
(0.014)

0.003
(0.012)

-0.002
(0.009)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
N
Panel D
DV: Youth is a current marijuana user

0.31
88,992

0.31
88,992

0.31
88,992

1

2

3

E-cigarette MLSA Law

-0.006
(0.015)

-0.019
(0.013)

-0.009
(0.015)

Mean of dep. var. in the control states
N

0.26
95,906

0.26
95,906

0.26
95,906

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends

✓

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1
are included.
Definitions of current smokers, drinkers, binge drinkers, and marijuana users are in the text.
E-cigarette MLSA Law is defined in the text.
Sample is restricted to youth who have aged out and were not exposed to the e-cigarette MLSA laws while
underage.
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Table 2.9 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Smoking; Stratified by Gender: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
DV: Youth is a current smoker
Panel A

4

Girls
5

6

0.019***
(0.005)

0.006
(0.005)

0.008
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.005)

2

3

4

5

6

-0.001
(0.005)

-0.003
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.005)

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.005
(0.005)

-0.007
(0.004)

–

–

–

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

0.013**
(0.006)

0.019**
(0.008)

0.023***
(0.007)

0.006
(0.005)

0.011*
(0.007)

0.014***
(0.005)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

0.027**
(0.011)

0.045***
(0.016)

0.032*
(0.017)

0.018***
(0.006)

0.018*
(0.010)

0.013
(0.010)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

E-cigarette MLSA Law
Panel B
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre
E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends
Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

1

Boys
2

3

0.013**
(0.006)

0.016**
(0.006)

1

0.16
359,044

0.16
359,044

✓
0.16
359,044

0.14
393,288

0.14
393,288

✓
0.14
393,288

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All models include dummy variables for race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
We define youth as current smokers if any days of smoking over the past month are reported. The analysis sample is restricted to youth younger than 18.
E-cigarette MLSA Law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text. One wave means one survey year.

106

Table 2.10 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Smoking; Stratified by Grade: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
DV: Youth is a current smoker
Panel A

9 & 10th graders

11 & 12th graders

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.012**
(0.005)

0.014
(0.009)

0.016**
(0.007)

0.008*
(0.005)

0.016*
(0.009)

0.018***
(0.005)

1

2

3

4

5

6

-0.003
(0.005)

0.003
(0.009)

-0.001
(0.006)

-0.011
(0.008)

-0.016
(0.011)

-0.017*
(0.007)

–

–

–

–

–

–

E-cigarette MLSA Wave of Enactment

0.012**
(0.005)

0.012
(0.012)

0.016**
(0.008)

0.007*
(0.004)

0.024**
(0.011)

0.025***
(0.008)

E-cigarette MLSA ≥1 Wave Post

0.022***
(0.007)

0.021
(0.016)

0.016
(0.016)

0.018***
(0.005)

0.036
(0.022)

0.046*
(0.024)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

E-cigarette MLSA Law

Panel B
E-cigarette MLSA ≤2 Waves Pre
E-cigarette MLSA 1 Wave Pre (Ref.)

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends
Mean of dep. var. in the control states
Observations

0.12

0.12

✓
0.12

461,560

461,560

461,560

0.16

0.16

✓
0.16

290,772

290,772

290,772

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1 are included.
We define youth as current smokers if any days of smoking is reported in the past month. The analysis sample is restricted to youth younger than 18.
E-cigarette MLSA Law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text. One wave means one survey year
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Table 2.11 — E-Cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age Laws, 2005 – 2015
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Effective Date

State

August 1, 2013
August 22, 2012
September 13, 2013
August 16, 2013
September 27, 2010
March 25, 2011
October 1, 2014
June 12, 2014
October 1, 2015
July 1, 2014
July 1, 2014
June 27, 2013
July 1, 2012
January 1, 2014
July 1, 2013
July 1, 2014
July 1, 2012
April 10, 2014
May 28, 2014
July 4, 2015
October 1, 2012
September 25, 2015
August 8, 2016
August 1, 2010
July 1, 2013
October 10, 2014

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Notes: By the end of August 2016, all states except Pennsylvania and Michigan have implemented E-Cigarette MLSA Laws.
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Effective Date
January 1, 2016
April 9, 2014
October 1, 2015
July 31, 2010
March 12, 2010
June 9, 2015
January 1, 2013
August 1, 2013
August 1, 2015
August 2, 2014
November 1, 2014
January 1, 2016
August 8, 2016
January 1, 2015
June 7, 2013
July 1, 2014
July 1, 2011
October 1, 2015
May 11, 2010
July 1, 2013
July 1, 2014
July 28, 2013
June 6, 2014
April 20, 2012
March 13, 2013

Table 2.12 – Test for the Parallel Trends Assumption: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015

Treated ×Pre-trends

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
N

Current
Smoker

Current
Drinker

Current
Binge Drinker

Current
Marijuana User

-0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.001)

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

459,784

436,271

436,271

467,754

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parenthesis.
Pre-trends refer to the time periods before the implementation of e-cigarette MLSA laws, shown on the x-axis in Figure 1 as negative values.
We convert these negative values to positive by multiplying -1.
Full controls include dummy variables for gender, age, race, and grade levels, as well as all the state-level covariates listed in Table 1.
Youth aged 18 or above are excluded.
Definitions of youth substance use are in the text.

109

Table 2.13 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Substance Use: National and State YRBSS: 20052015 (Strongly Balanced Sample)
Panel A

DV: Youth is a current smoker

DV: Youth is a first-time smoker

1

2

3

4

5

6

E-cigarette MLSA Law

0.010**
(0.004)

0.014**
(0.006)

0.017***
(0.005)

0.006**
(0.003)

0.007**
(0.004)

0.008***
(0.003)

N

625,719

625,719

625,719

455,908

455,908

455,908

Panel B

DV: Youth is a regular smoker

DV: Youth is a heavy smoker

1

2

3

4

5

6

E-cigarette MLSA Law

0.008*
(0.004)

0.011**
(0.004)

0.009***
(0.003)

0.008**
(0.003)

0.011***
(0.004)

0.009***
(0.003)

N

625,719

625,719

625,719

625,719

625,719

625,719

Panel C

DV: Youth is a current drinker

DV: Youth is a binge drinker

1

2

3

4

5

6

E-cigarette MLSA Law

-0.002
(0.009)

0.003
(0.010)

0.009
(0.010)

0.002
(0.007)

-0.003
(0.006)

-0.001
(0.006)

N

589,491

589,491

589,491

589,491

589,491

589,491

Panel D

DV: Youth is a marijuana user

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

1

2

3

E-cigarette MLSA Law

0.002
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.010)

0.000
(0.010)

N

632,304

632,304

632,304

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Full Controls
State FEs
Year FEs
State-specific linear pre-trends
State-specific linear trends

✓

✓

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All models include dummy variables for gender, race, age, and grade levels. State-level covariates listed in Table 1
are included.
E-cigarette MLSA law, the leads, and the lags are defined in the text.
The definitions of youth substance use are in the text.
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Table 2.14 — E-cigarette MLSA Law and Youth Substance Use: SCM-weighted Sample

E-cigarette MLSA Law

State FEs
N

Current
Smoker

Current
Drinker

Current
Binge Drinker

Current Marijuana
User

0.010*
(0.005)

0.008
(0.009)

0.008
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.009)

✓

✓

✓

✓

245

245

245

245

Notes: Standard errors, calculated using Donald and Lang’s (2007) two-step estimator, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10
We run SCM on each MLSA state by excluding all the other MLSA states from the estimation sample. We then pool these individually created synthetic
samples, thereby forming one larger SCM-weighted sample, and keep the synthetic weights unchanged. Lastly, we regress the difference of youth substance
use rates between the MLSA states and synthetic control states on an indicator variable for the enactment of e-cigarette MLSA laws and control for a set of
state dummy variables.
Youth aged 18 or above are excluded from creating such SCM-weighted sample.
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Table 2.15 — National and State YRBSS State by Year Observation Counts
State

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

1,026

483
1,268
3,545
1,979
2,110

2,528
1,218
2,846
1,927
2,802
1,684
2,319
2,257

1,654
1,279
3,876
1,327
1,877
1,721
2,000
2,421
316
7,409
2,033
4,172
1,921
4,500
3,062
1,513
2,133
1,973
1,115
9,079
2,793
2,915
4,711

1,845
1,183
1,744
1,802
2,463
304
2,377
2,590

1,810
1,343
2,698
2,746
5,779
270
2,429
2,638

6,840
2,278
4,467
2,090
3,793
824

6,854
402

3,502
1,503
1,553
1,475
2,442
2,633
4,982
3,579
1,627
1,667
492
1,682
1,588
1,909
3,766
158
1,325
1,398
3,598
3,479
95
1,963
2,987
3,706
1,529
1,249
1,800
5,417
9,939
4,466
1,710
1,663

1,997
2,357
5,098
2,744
1,148
1,384
2,956
2,653
1,666
1,692
3,842
1,299
1,267
1,486
3,745
3,723

5,591
3,146
1,692
2,102
4,432
1,473
2,196
1,726
1,437
8,445
1,590
2,624
3,636
188
1,763
1,681
1,785

1,923
1,865
3,846
1,729
1,581
689
2,780
13,688
3,975
1,722
2,433

2,403
1,450
2,203
5,495
15,335
5,550
1,767

112

1,846
344
4,022
3,719
207
1,359
1,730
5,685
13,161
3,324
1,863
1,358

2,089
2,257
1,063
8,343
51,769
2,630
4,627
292
2,144
1,825
4,745
1,824
2,069
1,590
2,027
5,325
10,409
2,171
1,919
1,578

2,050
4,022
2,057

2,465
9,112
54,356
3,238
4,879
745
2,040
1,594
4,308
1,634
1,787
14,310
208
8,486
10,406
5,891
2,064
227

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1,923
268
423
2,316
1,567
1,567
1,924
5,821
1,710
6,997
349
101
1,549
2,593

2,842

1,136

1,465

1,934

450
3,814
1,437
1,502
2,874
5,841
1,657
8,267
1,603
167
2,375
3,615

264
2,357
1,553
1,273
1,847
3,479
2,118

3,278
4,004
1,311
1,257
4,371
1,226

1,598
2,234

1,397
247
3,104
3,106
1,070
2,122
2,176
4,766
1,544
8,190
98
246
2,071
3,074

2,455

2,174

2,802

2,439

2,924

210
2,133
1,206
1,577
2,182
4,906
2,097
5,744
439
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7,776
195
1,753
2,776

20,151
4,310
102
1,803
2,317

Table 2.16 — National and State YRBSS State by Year Observation Counts (Strongly Balanced
Sample)
State

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming

1,026
3,502
1,503
1,553
2,442
2,633
4,982
3,579
1,667
492
1,682
3,766
1,325
1,398
3,598
3,479
1,963
2,987
1,529
1,249
1,800
5,417
9,939
4,466
1,710
1,923
423
2,316
1,567
1,567
1,924
5,821
349
1,549

483
3,545
1,979
2,110
1,997
2,357
5,098
2,744
1,384
2,956
2,653
3,842
1,267
1,486
3,745
3,723
1,865
3,846
1,729
1,581
689
2,780
13,688
3,975
1,722
2,842
210
2,133
1,206
1,577
2,182
4,906
439
1,598

2,528
2,846
1,927
2,802
2,319
2,257
5,591
3,146
2,102
4,432
1,473
1,726
8,445
1,590
2,624
3,636
1,681
1,785
2,403
1,450
2,203
5,495
15,335
5,550
1,767
1,397
3,104
3,106
1,070
2,122
2,176
4,766
98
2,071

1,654
3,876
1,327
1,877
2,000
2,421
7,409
2,033
1,921
4,500
3,062
1,973
9,079
2,793
2,915
4,711
344
4,022
207
1,359
1,730
5,685
13,161
3,324
1,863
1,136
450
3,814
1,437
1,502
2,874
5,841
1,603
2,375

1,845
1,744
1,802
2,463
2,377
2,590
6,840
2,278
2,090
3,793
824
2,257
8,343
51,769
2,630
4,627
1,825
4,745
2,069
1,590
2,027
5,325
10,409
2,171
1,919
1,465
264
2,357
1,553
1,273
1,847
3,479
7,776
1,753

1,810
2,698
2,746
5,779
2,429
2,638
6,854
402
2,050
4,022
2,057
2,465
9,112
54,356
3,238
4,879
1,594
4,308
1,787
14,310
208
8,486
10,406
5,891
2,064
1,934
3,278
4,004
1,311
1,257
4,371
1,226
4,310
1,803

2,455

2,174

2,802

2,439

2,924

2,317
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Figure 2.1 – Youth Substance Use Rates Between E-cigarette MLSA and Non-MLSA States: National and State YRBSS: 2005-2015
Notes: the x-axis indicates the survey year relative to the year e-cigarette MLSA laws turned on, and thus negative values represent periods before the law
change and positive values represent periods after the change. Year 0 represents the first year MLSA laws are coded as 1 based on our coding scheme. A
randomly selected pseudo-MLSA date drawn from the true distribution of effective dates among the MLSA states is assigned to each non-MLSA state and then
normalized to time 0. The graph plots the mean youth substance use rates between the MLSA (solid lines) and non-MLSA states (dashed lines) after netting
out the state fixed effects. For scaling purposes, we added the mean youth substance use rate calculated over the entire sample to each adjusted substance
use rate (adjusted for state fixed effects only). Sample statistics are weighted by the total underage population.
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Figure 2.2 – Youth Substance Use Rates Between E-cigarette MLSA States and Synthetic Control States
Notes: as in Figure 1, the x-axis indicates the survey year relative to the year of e-cigarette MLSA law change. The graph plots the mean youth substance use
rates between the MLSA and synthetic control states after netting out the state fixed effects. For scaling purposes, we added the mean substance use rate
calculated over the pooled SCM-weighted sample to each adjusted substance use rate (adjusted for state fixed effects). Sample statistics are weighted by the
total underage population.
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CHAPTER 3
Can Cigarette Taxes Still Reduce Teen Smoking?68
1. Introduction
Cigarette smoking is the world’s leading cause of preventable death, killing an estimated
six million people per year (World Health Organization 2015). In the U.S., despite large
reductions in the smoking rate over the past several decades, smoking still leads to an
estimated 480,000 deaths and $289 billion in costs from medical care and lost productivity.
Public policies on tobacco control include taxation, bans on smoking in public places, regulated
dispensation, criminalization, and informational campaigns, with taxation still being touted as
the most effective intervention in the public health community. Many tobacco control efforts
focus on teenagers, as 90% of adult smokers started before age 18 (US Department of Health
Human Services 2014). These efforts have largely been successful, as the percentage of U.S.
teens who smoke fell to 16% in 2013 from a high of 36% (see Figure 3.1).
An extensive literature has examined the relationship between cigarette excise taxes
and teen smoking.69 Early studies relied on cross-sectional approaches and generally found
that higher taxes were associated with lower cigarette consumption (Baltagi and Goel 1987,
Chapman and Richardson 1990, Seldon and Boyd 1991, Peterson et al. 1992, Chaloupka and
Saffer 1992, Sung, Hu, and Keeler 1994, Keeler et al. 1996). Results from such studies may not
be causally interpretable, however, as states with stronger anti-smoking sentiments tend to

This chapter is a joint work with Charles Courtemanche from University of Kentucky.
See Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Bader, Boisclair and Ferrence (2011), and Guindon (2013) for more detailed
reviews of the literature than we provide here.
68
69
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levy higher taxes and stronger sentiments discourage smoking directly. 70 Some researchers
showed that the negative association persisted after controlling for proxies for state antismoking sentiment, such as smoke-free air laws and tobacco control expenditures, but it is
difficult to capture all possible unobserved confounders in a cross-sectional design (Wasserman
et al. 1991, Chaloupka and Saffer 1992, Chaloupka and Grossman 1996, Chaloupka and
Wechsler 1997, Lewit et al. 1997, Chaloupka and Pacula 1998, Tauras and Chaloupka 1999,
Bardsley and Olekalns 1999).
The next wave of the literature controls for unobserved, time-invariant state
characteristics by estimating state fixed effects models. Using data from the National Education
Longitudinal Study (NELS), DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2002) found little to no evidence of an
effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking initiation after including state fixed effects.
Carpenter and Cook (2008) (hereafter CC) also include state fixed effects but use data from the
Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS), which allows for a much larger sample size spanning a
longer period (1991 to 2005) than the NELS does. 71 They find that higher taxes decrease youth
smoking participation and frequent smoking, though the magnitude of the effects are smaller
than those found in the associational literature. Most recently, Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017)
(hereinafter HSR) revisit the findings in CC by extending the sample period to 2013. 72 Using
state fixed effects models, they document a negative relationship between cigarette taxes and

For instance, the average state-level cigarette excise tax rates in New York are more than eightfold of that in
North Carolina over the period 1991–2013 (Orzechowski & Walker 2014). Surveys seeking to understand
individual perception of smoking (DeCicca et al. 2008) also find that anti-smoking sentiments are much stronger in
New York than in North Carolina.
71 CC use micro-level data from the national YRBS as well as aggregate-level data from the state and local YRBS.
72 Unlike CC, HSR use the micro-level data from both the national and state YRBS, which is the same data source we
will employ.
70
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youth smoking across the full sample period (1991-2013), but find no evidence of an effect in
the most recent years (2007-2013). This is an important result, as it implies that further tax
increases would not lead to further reductions in teen smoking. Additionally, they show that
the effect in the full sample period disappears if state-specific linear time trends are added.
While including state trends helps account for time-varying unobservables that are correlated
with tax changes and youth smoking, it does so at the cost of discarding potentially useful
identifying variation in taxes.73 Accordingly, HSR are agnostic as to which model is preferable.
The goal of our paper is to shed light on two important unresolved questions from HSR’s
work. First, why has the effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking disappeared in recent
years? We argue that the diminished tax effect can be attributed to an inherently nonlinear
relationship.74 Price-sensitive youth are the most likely to be responsive initially as the
cigarette tax begins to rise. After decades of tax increases, price-sensitive youth may have
already been driven from the market, leaving only price-insensitive youth who are not
responsive to continued increases. The result is a non-linear relationship between cigarette tax
rate and youth smoking, with the marginal effect being strongest at low levels of taxation. The
average baseline tax rate in 2007 may have been high enough to be in the flat portion of the
curve, leading to HSR’s finding of a null effect during the 2007-2013 period.
We provide two pieces of evidence to support this proposition. First, we estimate the
relationship between cigarette tax rate and youth smoking semi-parametrically using Yatchew’s

To illustrate, in our data 85% of the total variation in cigarette excise taxes can be explained by state and year
fixed effects alone over the period 1991-2013. Further incorporating state-specific linear time trends increases the
explained variation to 95%, meaning that we are left with 5% of the overall variation in tax rates to identify their
impacts on youth smoking.
74 HSR mention this possibility in their conclusion.
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difference estimator. This allows the data to choose the appropriate functional form,
conditional on state and year fixed effects as well as observable characteristics. The results
indeed document a diminishing marginal effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking, with the
average 2007 tax rate lying in the relatively flat portion of the curve. This finding is robust to
the use of parametric non-linear models such as a quadratic specification in taxes. Second, our
hypothesis implies that tax increases should still effectively deter youth smoking in states with
low baseline tax rates, since they are not yet on the flat of the curve. Consistent with this
prediction, we show that higher taxes lead to statistically significant and economically
meaningful reductions in teen smoking in 2007-2013 in states with low 2007 tax rates. In other
words, raising cigarette taxes can still reduce teen smoking in some states, even if there is little
to no effect across the country on average.
The second unresolved question from HSR is whether, in light of the sensitivity of the
full-sample-period results to the inclusion of state-specific time trends, there has ever actually
been a true, causal effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking in the first place. Interestingly,
we find that the results using non-linear modeling approaches actually are robust to the
inclusion of state trends. This means that conclusions on the relationship between cigarette
taxes and youth smoking can be reached even without resolving the methodological debate
about whether models with or without state trends are more appropriate.

2. Data
Following HSR, we use data from the national and state YRBS, spanning 1991 to 2013.
The YRBS is one of the leading data sources on youth risky behaviors. Started in 1991, the YRBS
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has surveyed thousands of high school students around the country and has been implemented
every other year. The national YRBS is conducted by Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the state YRBS, while coordinated by CDC, is usually administered by the
participating state health departments or education agencies.75 The advantage of pooling the
national and state YRBS is sample size, as this leads to about six times more observations than
the national YRBS alone. The YRBS’ smoking question is, “During the past 30 days, on how
many days did you smoke cigarettes?” Following CDC’s benchmark, we define youth as current
smokers if any day of smoking is reported and as frequent smokers if cigarettes are used more
than 20 days over the past month.
Our cigarette tax variable is the combined state and federal excise tax rate in effect at
the end of March of each survey year. The prior literature generally includes only state tax
rates since tax changes at the federal level are common to all states and thus absorbed by the
time effects. We also include federal taxes because of our focus on nonlinearities: starting
place along the distribution matters for the predicted marginal effect, and federal tax rate
matters for the starting place. Our use of the tax rate from March, which follows CC and HSR, is
done because the YRBS does not provide survey dates and most states administer YRBS in the
spring when school is in session. Finally, we convert the nominal tax rate to 2013 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI–U).

Many states have authorized CDC to distribute their data for secondary analyses and for states that have not, we
received their permissions to use the data. In addition, we have obtained permission from CDC to use state
identifiers in the national YRBS dataset. The states included in both the national and state YRBS vary somewhat
each year, though our inclusion of state fixed effects should mitigate any resulting bias in the econometric
estimates. See HSR for state-by-year observation counts; our sample is nearly identical to theirs.
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We control for individual characteristics and state-level policies that could correlate
with changes in both cigarette taxes and youth smoking. The individual-level controls are age in
years as well as dummy variables for gender (female), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white (base
category), non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other races), and grade level (9th grade (base
category), 10th, 11th, and 12th). The first state-level control is an indicator variable for the
comprehensiveness of smoke-free air laws, set equal to one if smoking is banned in
government and private worksites, restaurants, and bars, and 0 otherwise. This information
comes from the CDC STATE system. The other state-level variables are unemployment rates in
March and the natural logarithm of per capita personal income, obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables discussed above for CC’s sample
period of 1991-2005 and HSR’s other sample periods of 1991-2013 and 2007-2013. From 19912005 to 2007-2013, youth smoking prevalence declined from 27% to 16% while cigarette taxes
and the prevalence of comprehensive smoke-free air laws increased substantially. The
demographic characteristics stayed relatively steady over time, aside from a modest shift in the
racial/ethnic makeup of the population from non-Hispanic white to Hispanic and other groups.
We also observe a higher unemployment rate in the later sample period, which corresponds
with the Great Recession and gradual recovery.
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3. Replication
We begin our empirical analysis by showing that we can replicate CC’s and HSR’s results
with our data. Following their approaches, we estimate the average marginal effects of
cigarette taxes on youth smoking by running logistic regressions of the form
∗
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡
= βCigTaxst + 𝚾 ′ 𝛄 + ws + vt + εist .

(1)

∗
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡
is a latent variable reflecting the smoking frequency of youth i in state s in year t. We do

not observe 𝑌 ∗ , but instead observe the dichotomous variables for current and frequent
smoking. The vector 𝐗 contains the aforementioned individual- and state-level controls. State
fixed effects, which account for time-invariant state-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and
year fixed effects, which capture any macro-level shocks common to all states, are denoted by
ws and vt , respectively. By convention, we cluster standard errors at the state level (Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004, Cameron and Miller 2015).
Table 3.2 reports the resulting average marginal effects of cigarette taxes on youth
current and frequent smoking, alongside estimates from CC and HSR. The first three columns
use CC’s sample period of 1991-2005, the next two use HSR’s full sample period of 1991-2013,
and the final two use HSR’s other sample period of interest: 2007-2013. As in HSR, we present
results from the state, national, and combined state and national versions of the YRBS.
The main takeaway from Table 3.2 is that we are able to replicate the results of CC and
HSR fairly closely despite small differences in sample sizes. Using data from the national YRBS
between 1991 and 2005, CC find that a dollar increase in the state cigarette excise tax is
associated with a 5.9 percentage point (pp) decrease in youth smoking participation and a 4.1
pp decrease in frequent smoking. Using the same dataset, our calculation suggests that a one123

dollar increase in the tax rate reduces youth smoking participation by 4.4 pp and frequent
smoking by 2.6 pp. The magnitudes of the tax effects are slightly smaller in the dataset we use,
but they are quite close to those of HSR (4.6 pp and 2.6 pp respectively). 76 We also confirm
HSR’s result that the effects shrink roughly in half after adding data from the 2007-2013 waves
and become statistically insignificant if the sample is restricted to just the 2007-2013 period.
Also similarly to HSR, we find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use the state
or combined state and national versions of the YRBS as opposed to just the national version.
Since the estimates are the most precise in the combined dataset, we will use that for the
remainder of our analyses.
Table 3.3 presents the results for the combined dataset after adding state-specific linear
time trends, alongside the corresponding estimates from HSR. Again, consistent with their
results, cigarette tax is no longer statistically significantly associated with youth smoking once
state trends are included, even during the period (1991-2005) over which taxes exhibit a
strongly deterrent effect without the state trends. This could indicate that the observed
relationship between cigarette taxes and youth smoking is attributable to time-varying state
unobservables rather than a genuine causal effect. Alternatively, the state trends could be
eliminating useful variation. After including them, only 5% of the variation in cigarette tax
remains, and the effect of that small portion of the variation could conceivably be different
from the genuine causal effect of the remaining, discarded variation. Researchers have

One reason that our estimates, as well as those of HSR, are smaller than those reported by CC is that CC
calculated the “marginal” change in smoking rates resulting from a $1 change in cigarette tax using the linear
projection function after running the logistic regression. We, and HSR, instead calculate the average marginal
effects.
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debated the appropriateness of controlling for state trends in the cigarette taxation literature.
See, for instance, the dialogue between Gruber and Frakes (2006) and Chou, Grossman, and
Saffer (2006). We therefore take an agnostic view about which model is more appropriate and
will show that, fortunately, the distinction will not ultimately matter after better accounting for
nonlinearities.

4. Semi-parametric Analyses
In this section, we employ Yatchew’s difference estimator to trace out the impacts of
cigarette excise tax on youth smoking semi-parametrically, thereby allowing the data to choose
the appropriate functional form (Yatchew 2003, 1997). The model becomes
𝑌ist = β𝑓(CigTaxst ) + 𝚾 ′ 𝛄 + ws + vt + εist ,

(2)

where the key change is the flexible functional form for cigarette tax.77 By construction, 𝑓(•) is
a smooth, single-valued function with bounded first-order derivatives. Yatchew’s difference
estimator is partially linear; therefore, 𝚾 ′ 𝛄, 𝑓(CigTaxs,t ), and the error term εist are additively
separable. A detailed explanation of the method is outside the scope of this paper but its logic
can be summarized as follows. For ease of exposition, let 𝑓(TL ) denote 𝑓(CigTaxs,t ).
To begin with, the estimator arranges data in the order of Tax1 < Tax2 < ⋯ < Taxj,
where j indicates the total number of observations in the estimation sample. The specification

Another change is that the discrete nature of the outcome variable is no longer formally modeled. To verify that
this alone is inconsequential, Appendix Table 1 reports the results using a linear probability model rather than
logit. The estimates are very similar to the corresponding marginal effects from Table 3.1.
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in (2) is then estimated in the form of “first-order” differences: 𝑦𝐼 − 𝑦𝐼−1 = β𝑓(TL − TL−1 ) +
𝚾 ′ 𝛄 + εi,s,t − εi,s,t−1, generalizing to
𝑚

𝑚

𝑚

𝑚

∑(𝑑𝑛 𝑦𝐼−𝑛 ) = 𝛾 (∑ 𝑑𝑛 𝑥𝐼−𝑛 ) + ∑ 𝑑𝑛 𝑓(𝑇𝐿−𝑛 ) + ∑ 𝑑𝑛 𝜀𝐼−𝑛
𝑛=1

𝑛=1

𝑛=1

(3)

𝑛=1

where 𝑚 denotes the order differencing and 𝑑0 , 𝑑1 , … , 𝑑𝑚 are the differencing coefficients that
satisfy a pre-imposed condition:
𝑚

𝑚

∑ 𝑑𝑛 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑑𝑛2 = 1
𝑛=1

𝑛=1

Since TL (cigarette excise tax) has a compact support, ∑𝑚
𝑛=1 𝑑𝑛 𝑓(𝑇𝐿−𝑛 ) shrinks and is
removed as the sample size increases. The parameter γ is estimated using OLS regression and
the function 𝑓 is derived by regressing (𝑦𝐼 − 𝚾 ′ γ̂dif ) on TL non-parametrically, analogous to a
stylized locally weighted regression. The differencing order 𝑚 affects the estimator’s
asymptotic efficiency and Monte Carlo simulations report noticeable efficiency gains from
higher-order differencing (Lokshin 2006).78 In the following analyses, we set 𝑚 equal to 7
because higher order differencing (8th-10th) is no longer associated with efficiency gains, only
additional computational intensity.
The upper panel of Figure 3.2 presents the smoothed tax effects (𝑓(TL )) on youth
current smoking while the bottom panel shows the effects on youth frequent smoking, both
with data from the combined national and state YRBS, spanning 1991–2013. The figures on the
left show the results without the state trends, while those on the right include them. It is
apparent that the deterrent effect of cigarette tax on smoking is not constant but diminishing

78

10th order differencing is the upper bound imposed by Yatchew’s difference estimator.
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over the tax range. This pattern is particularly pronounced when we account for the statespecific time trends, as the predicted rates of both current and frequent smoking are essentially
flat at tax rates of higher than $3.
Figure 3.3 depicts the same results in a different manner by plotting how the marginal
effects, rather than the predicted smoking rates, change across the tax distribution. In all four
graphs (both outcomes, with and without state trends), the marginal effect of taxes on youth
smoking is negative and significant at low levels of taxation, but eventually becomes
insignificant. The effects on current and frequent smoking turn insignificant at tax rates of
approximately $2 per pack without state trends, compared to less than $1 once state trends are
added. In three of the four graphs, the effects actually turn positive and significant at the
highest tax rates, though we caution against a literal interpretation of that result since it is
based on very few state-year combinations.

5. Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
The results from Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are consistent with the hypothesis that the
disappearance of an effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking is due to an inherently
nonlinear relationship: steadily rising tax rates over several decades have driven price-sensitive
consumers from the market, leaving only those who are price-insensitive continuing to smoke.
This section conducts a variety of robustness checks in an effort to rule out possible alternative
explanations.
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Cigarette Prices Instead of Taxes
First, our hypothesis relates to consumer responses to cigarette prices, but our analyses
thus far focus on taxes. A diminishing marginal effect of taxes does not necessarily imply a
diminishing marginal effect of prices. For instance, if tax increases did not pass through as fully
to prices in recent years, we might observe a diminishing effect of taxes but linear effect of
prices. Figure 3.4 therefore presents results for a semi-parametric analysis identical to that in
equation (3) but replacing tax rates with (tax-inclusive) per-pack prices. The shapes of all four
graphs are similar to those from Figure 2, with a diminishing marginal effect being evident in all
cases. Particular flattening appears to occur at a price of around $7 per pack.
Alternative Functional Forms
Another possible concern is that the observed pattern of nonlinearity might be an
artifact of the particular functional form chosen by the Yatchew semi-parametric method. It is
therefore useful to check if a similar pattern emerges using a simpler parametric nonlinear
specification. Table 3.4 therefore reports results from a model including both cigarette tax and
its square (i.e. quadratic in cigarette tax). Given the difficulty of interpreting nonlinear models
with interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003), we employ a linear probability model (LPM) rather
than a logit. We therefore also present results for a LPM without the squared term in order to
verify that they are similar to the average marginal effects from the logistic regressions
reported previously.79

Specifically, since the regressions in Table 3.4 all use the combined sample from 1991-2013, the -0.012 estimate
for current smoker from the first column should be compared to the -0.011 estimate from the combined
sample/1991-2013/current paper/current smoker cell in Table 3.2, while the -0.010 estimate for frequent smoker
should be compared to the -0.007 estimate from the combined sample/1991-2013/current paper/frequent smoker
cell in Table 3.2. Similarly, the estimates including state trends from the third column of Table 3.4 – 0.004 and
79
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The results from the quadratic specifications, for both outcomes and regardless of
whether state trends are included, are consistent with those from the semi-parametric model.
In all four cases, the coefficient estimate for cigarette tax is negative and significant while that
for its square is positive and significant. This indicates a negative effect at low levels of taxation
that gradually diminishes and eventually turns positive. Without state trends, the marginal
effect turns positive at a tax rate of $3.50 for current smoker and $2.67 for frequent smoker,
respectively. In the semiparametric results shown in Figure 3, the corresponding marginal
effects both cross zero at around $3.20. With state trends, the marginal effects from the
quadratic specification in Table 4 become positive at just $0.85 and $0.87 for current and
frequent smoker, respectively. In the semiparametric models from Figure 3.3, the marginal
effects with state trends cross zero at somewhat higher rates of about $2.20 and $2.60.
Nonetheless, the fact that the general shapes of the curves are the same is reassuring.
Table 3.9 further reports results from cubic, quartic, and quintic specifications, while
Table 3.10 does the same adding linear state-specific time trends. The higher-order polynomial
terms are always insignificant, meaning that there is little additional information to be learned
from parametric models beyond quadratic.
Another issue related to functional form is whether the observed diminishing marginal
effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking could simply reflect a constant elasticity. If every
100% increase in the tax rate leads to the same percentage change in smoking, this would still

0.001, respectively – parallel the estimates of 0.002 and 0.000 from the fourth column of Table 3.3. Table 3.8
reports results from linear probability models using other samples and time periods.
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show up as a diminishing marginal effect when the regression is run in levels.80 Elasticities can
be estimated using a log-log functional form, but that is not feasible with the individual-level
YRBS data because of the dichotomous nature of the outcomes. We therefore aggregate the
data to the state-by-year level and re-estimate regression equation (1) as a LPM with the
natural logarithm of the percentage of youth who are current (or frequent) smokers as the
dependent variable and the natural logarithm of the tax rate as the independent variable. The
coefficient β from this new specification can be interpreted as the (approximate) tax elasticity
of cigarette consumption. We weight each observation by the number of individuals in the
state-by-year cell to preserve comparability to individual-level estimates (Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft 2007).
The results in Table 5 show that the cigarette tax elasticity did change over time.
Specifically, the tax elasticities from 1991-2005 are 17% for current smoking and 31% for
frequent smoking. The elasticities shrink roughly in half after incorporating survey waves
through 2013, and they turn positive but small and insignificant in 2007-2013 alone. This is
essentially the same pattern observed in our main estimates from Table 3.2.
E-Cigarettes
E-cigarettes, whose popularity among teens rose sharply during the years added to the
sample by HSR, are a possible confounding factor. Is it possible that the availability of this new

To illustrate, suppose an increase in the tax rate from $0.50 to $1 reduces the smoking rate from 20% to 17%.
This would mean a 100% increase in tax reduces smoking by 15%, for an elasticity of 0.15. At the same elasticity,
an additional 100% increase in taxes to $2 would only decrease the smoking rate to 14.45%. Since we achieve a
smaller decrease in smoking rates out of a larger increase in tax rates (in levels), it follows that for an equivalent
increase in cigarette taxes ($0.5), we would have seen an even smaller decrease in smoking rates. Therefore,
when estimated in levels, this constant elasticity would show up as a diminishing marginal effect, as the increase in
taxes at higher values will always be a larger dollar amount than the increase in taxes at lower values, with the
resulting percentage point change in the smoking rate being smaller.
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nicotine delivery system accounts for the reduced tax elasticity observed above? Theoretically,
this seems unlikely, as the availability of a new substitute should, if anything, increase
consumers’ price responsiveness in the traditional cigarette market.81 To further rule out this
concern, we next conduct an analysis of the effect of cigarette taxes on youth e-cigarette use.
Since the YRBS did not include e-cigarette questions during our study period, we instead
use data from the National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS), which included such questions from
2011-2013. During this period, the percentage of youth who report ever using e-cigarettes rose
from 3% to 8%, while the percentage reporting current use (past 30 days) rose from 1% to 3%.
Therefore, while we are not able to study e-cigarettes until 2011, the very low rate of use as of
2011 suggests that it is unlikely that there was any meaningful effect of cigarette taxes on ecigarette use prior to then.
Table 3.6 reports the results from logistic regressions of the same form as equation (1)
but with ever using and currently using e-cigarettes as the outcomes. The coefficient estimate
for cigarette tax is small and statistically significant in both cases. These results suggest that our
finding of a diminishing marginal effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking is unlikely to be
attributable to the introduction of e-cigarettes toward the end of our sample period.

There is debate in the literature about whether cigarettes and e-cigarettes are actually substitutes. Conceivably,
they could be complements if e-cigarettes serve as a gateway to subsequent traditional smoking. Available
evidence from quasi-experimental studies of the impact of e-cigarette regulations on youth smoking seems to
suggest that, if anything, the two products are substitutes (Friedman 2015, Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal 2016, Dave,
Feng, and Pesko 2017). Moreover, even if they were complements, subsequent transition to traditional cigarettes
might occur after the respondents leave high school, in which case they would be outside of our sample age range.
81
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6. Average Effects in States with Low Baseline Tax Rates
The results thus far provide, in our view, compelling evidence of fundamental
nonlinearity in youths’ responses to rising cigarette taxes, with effects being relatively strong at
low baseline levels of taxation and small or zero at higher levels. This nonlinearity provides an
explanation for the disappearance of an average effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking in
the 2007-2013 sample period. However, it also implies that youths in states with low tax rates
at the start of this period may still have been responsive to tax increases, as their states were
not yet on the “flat of the curve”. In other words, price-sensitive consumers had not yet been
driven out of the market in these states.
To directly test this hypothesis, we re-estimate equation (1) for the 2007-2013 sample
period, stratifying into three groups based on baseline (2007) state tax rates.82 The first group
consists of 13 states with baseline state taxes rates of no more than $0.50 per pack. These
states are AL, GA, FL, IA, KY, LA, MS, MO, NC, ND, SC, TN, and VA. Between 2007 and 2013, six
of these states (FL, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN) raised cigarette taxes at least once, with Florida
implementing the largest increase, from $0.39 to $1.39 per pack. The middle group consists of
25 states with baseline state tax rates between $0.50 and $1.50, while the high tax group
contains 13 states with tax rates over $1.50.
Table 3.7 presents the results, both with and without state-specific linear time trends.
Among these 13 states with low 2007 tax rates, taxes are indeed negatively and significantly
associated with youth smoking during the 2007-2013 period. A one-dollar increase reduces

Since the number of states in each stratified sample is relatively small, we use bootstrapped standard errors
instead of clustering standard errors by state (Courtemanche and Zapata 2014).
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current and frequent smoking by 0.9 and 1 pp, respectively, in the regressions without state
trends and 2.3 and 2.5 pp in the regressions with them. The latter are similar to the
magnitudes from the 1991-2005 period during which baseline (1991) tax rates in most states
were low and, accordingly, CC, HSR, and the current study found statistically significant average
effects across the whole country.83 In contrast, the effects in the middle and high tax groups
are all small and statistically insignificant. Since the vast majority of the population lives in the
middle and high tax states as opposed to the low tax states, the null average effect during
2007-2013 pooling all states together is not surprising.

7. Discussion
A recent study by HSR finds that the deterrent effect of cigarette excise taxes on youth
smoking documented by CC and others has disappeared in recent years, raising questions about
their continued effectiveness in achieving public health objectives. In this paper, we provide
evidence from semi-parametric and parametric models that this phenomenon is attributable to
a fundamentally nonlinear relationship. Tax increases are effective in reducing youth smoking
up to a point, but once tax rates are sufficiently high that price sensitive consumers have
already left the market, further tax increases are ineffective (other than as a revenue source).
During the 1991-2005 period examined by CC, initial tax rates were sufficiently low that
subsequent increases did reduce youth smoking. In contrast, during the 2007-2013 period

Table 3.11 explores adding higher order polynomials and finds that quadratic, cubic, quartic, and quintic terms
are all insignificant. This suggests that the cigarette tax effect is approximately linear for low-baseline-tax states,
consistent with the tax increases occurring in the left portion of the curves from Figure 2, before the diminishing
marginal effects become particularly evident.
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added by HSR, baseline tax rates in most states were sufficiently high that additional increases
did not prove to be effective deterrents on average. However, in states that still had low taxes
in 2007, tax increases in subsequent years did indeed reduce smoking. In other words, the
disappearance of the average effect is simply due to the extensive nature of prior tax increases,
as opposed to, for instance, an underlying change in consumer demand. Interestingly, our
conclusions are not sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends, which
contrasts the sensitivity observed by HSR in regressions with a more restrictive functional form.
Our findings have implications for cigarette tax policy moving forward. In principle, our
results suggest that further tax increases would be effective in reducing youth smoking in states
that still have low tax rates. For how many states might this be the case? The point estimates
from our semi-parametric regressions imply that the “flat of the curve” begins at a tax rate of
no less than $2.20 or greater (Figure 3, upper right graph). As of this writing, sixteen states still
had combined state and federal tax rates of under $2.20. 84 The somewhat sizeable confidence
intervals around our semi-parametric estimates mean that this is only a rough estimate, but
there are likely at least some states that have not yet reached the flat of the curve. In other
words, cigarette taxation can still be an effective tobacco control intervention in some cases.

State and federal tax rates from June 2018 come from
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0097.pdf.
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Table 3.1 — Summary Statistics
1991-2005

2007-2013

1991-2013

Current smoker

0.27 [0.44]

0.16 [0.36]

0.21 [0.41]

Frequent smoker

0.13 [0.33]

0.06 [0.24]

0.09 [0.29]

Female

0.51 [0.50]

0.52 [0.50]

0.52 [0.50]

Age

16.0 [1.21]

16.0 [1.23]

16.0 [1.22]

Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Others

0.64 [0.48]
0.16 [0.36]
0.11 [0.31]
0.09 [0.29]

0.56 [0.50]
0.14 [0.35]
0.17 [0.37]
0.13 [0.34]

0.60 [0.49]
0.15 [0.36]
0.14 [0.35]
0.11 [0.32]

9th grade
10th grade
11th grade
12th grade

0.28 [0.45]
0.27 [0.44]
0.24 [0.43]
0.21 [0.41]

0.28 [0.45]
0.27 [0.44]
0.25 [0.43]
0.21 [0.41]

0.28 [0.45]
0.27 [0.44]
0.24 [0.43]
0.21 [0.41]

Cigarette excise taxes (2013 $)
Comprehensive smoke-free air law
State unemployment rates
Natural logarithm of per capita personal income

0.80 [0.48]
0.03 [0.18]
5.12 [1.31]
10.19 [0.25]

2.29 [1.10]
0.47 [0.50]
6.98 [2.03]
10.64 [0.17]

1.54 [1.13]
0.25 [0.44]
6.05 [1.95]
10.41 [0.31]

535,135

537,320

1,072,455

Observations

Notes: means and standard deviations (in brackets) are reported.
We define youth as a current smoker if any day of smoking is reported. We define youth as a frequent smoker if she smoked
cigarettes in 20 or more days over the past month.
Cigarette excise taxes include federal and state tax rates, effective in March of a given survey year. Cigarette tax data come from
The Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2014).
We inflation adjust cigarette tax rates to 2013 dollars using CPI-U.
Comprehensive smoke-free air law is an indicator variable set equal to one if smoking is restricted in government and private work
places, restaurants, and bars, effective in February of a given survey year. Data come from CDC STATE System.
State unemployment rates, in February of a given survey year, come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Per capita income comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Table 3 2 — Average Marginal Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking
Current
HSR
Paper
State YRBS

Current
Paper

HSR

Current
Paper

-0.026***
(0.009)

-0.025***
(0.007)

-0.010**
(0.005)

-0.009**
(0.004)

0.007
(0.006)

0.006
(0.005)

-0.024
(N/A)

-0.019*
(0.006)

-0.023***
(0.005)

-0.007***
(0.003)

-0.008***
(0.003)

0.002
(0.003)

0.001
(0.003)

181

409,385

431,298

883,691

913,239

474,306

481,941

CC

HSR

Current
Smoker

-0.027
(N/A)

Frequent
Smoker
N

National YRBS
Current
Smoker

-0.059
(N/A)

-0.046***
(0.022)

-0.044**
(0.020)

-0.028***
(0.009)

-0.020*
(0.010)

-0.011
(0.020)

-0.012
(0.026)

Frequent
Smoker

-0.041
(N/A)

-0.026*
(0.014)

-0.026*
(0.015)

-0.016***
(0.006)

-0.012*
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.015)

-0.009
(0.020)

101,633

103,408

103,837

158,605

159,216

55,197

55,318

N

Combined State and National YRBS
Current
Smoker

N/A

-0.030***
(0.008)

-0.030***
(0.007)

-0.011**
(0.005)

-0.011**
(0.004)

0.007
(0.006)

0.006
(0.005)

Frequent
Smoker

N/A

-0.019***
(0.006)

-0.020***
(0.005)

-0.007***
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.002)

0.002
(0.003)

0.007
(0.005)

512,793

535,135

1,042,296

1,072,455

529,503

537,320

1991–2005

1991–2005

1991–2013

1991–2013

2007–2013

2007–2013

N
Time Span

1991–2005

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
CC=Carpenter and Cook (2008), HSR=Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017).
Survey weights applied when the analysis sample uses data solely from the national YRBS.
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Table 3 3 — Average Marginal Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking Including Linear State-Specific Time
Trends
HSR

Current
Paper

HSR

Current
Paper

HSR

Current
Paper

Current
Smoker

-0.007
(0.008)

-0.004
(0.008)

0.003
(0.009)

0.002
(0.008)

-0.005
(0.006)

-0.006
(0.006)

Frequent
Smoker

-0.008
(0.006)

-0.008
(0.006)

0.000
(0.005)

0.000
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)

0.000
(0.004)

N

512,793

535,135

1,042,296

1,072,455

529,503

537,320

1991–2005

1991–2005

1991–2013

1991–2013

2007–2013

2007–2013

Time Span

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
CC=Carpenter and Cook (2008), HSR=Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017).
Survey weights applied when the analysis sample uses data solely from the national YRBS.

Table 3.4 — Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking from Quadratic Specification

Youth is a Current Smoker
Cigarette Tax

Linear

Quadratic

Linear Adding
State Trends

-0.012*
(0.006)

-0.021***
(0.006)

0.004
(0.008)

0.003***
(0.001)

Cigarette Tax Squared
Youth is a Frequent Smoker
Cigarette Tax

-0.010**
(0.004)

-0.016***
(0.005)

Observations

1,072,455

1,072,455

-0.017**
(0.008)
0.004***
(0.001)

0.001
(0.005)

0.003***
(0.001)

Cigarette Tax Squared

Quadratic
Adding State
Trends

-0.013***
(0.005)
0.003***
(0.001)

1,072,455

1,072,455

Notes: Results are from linear probability models estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample from 1991-2013.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
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Table 3.5 — Estimated Cigarette Tax Elasticities using Aggregated State-Level Data
1991-2005

2007-2013

1991-2013

-0.172**
(0.069)

0.077
(0.088)

-0.088*
(0.044)

-0.313***
(0.098)

0.079
(0.131)

-0.153**
(0.064)

299

188

487

Panel A: ln(% Current Smokers)
ln(Cigarette Tax)
Panel B: ln(% Frequent Smokers)
ln(Cigarette Tax)
N

Notes: Results are from linear probability models using the combined state and national YRBS sample.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
Observations are weighted by the state/year cell size.

Table 3.6 — Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth E-Cigarette Use
Panel A: Youth Ever Used E-Cigarettes
Cigarette Tax

-0.010
(0.012)

N

57,178

Panel B: Youth is a Current E-Cigarette User
Cigarette Tax

0.001
(0.005)

N

56,916

Notes: Results are from logistic regressions using the National Youth Tobacco Survey: 2011-2013
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parenthesis.
Average marginal effects reported. Sampling weights are applied.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
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Table 3.7 — Average Marginal Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking in 2007-2013: States Grouped by
2007 Tax Rate
Low 2007
Tax States

Low 2007
Tax States;
Add State
Trends

Medium
2007 Tax
States

Medium
2007 Tax
States; Add
State Trends

High 2007
Tax States

High 2007
Tax States;
Add State
Trends

Current
Smoker

-0.009**
[0.004]

-0.023**
[0.011]

0.004
[0.007]

-0.005
[0.012]

-0.005
[0.009]

-0.004
[0.014]

Frequent
Smoker

-0.010**
[0.004]

-0.025**
[0.009]

0.001
[0.003]

0.004
[0.008]

-0.005
[0.006]

0.002
[0.006]

Observations

114,078

114,078

275,070

275,070

148,172

148,172

Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample.
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
States included in the low tax group are AL, GA, FL, KY, IA, LA, MS, MO, NC, ND, SC, TN, and VA.
States included in the medium tax group are AR, CA, CO, DC, DE, ID, IL, IN, KS, MD, MN, NE, NV, NH, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, TN, UT,
WV, WI, and WY.
States included in the high tax group are AK, AZ, CT, HI, ME, MA, MI, MT, NJ, RI, SD, VT, and WA.
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Table 3.8 — Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking from Linear Probability Models
1991-2005

1991-2013

2007-2013

State YRBS
Current Smoker

-0.027***
(0.009)

-0.011**
(0.005)

0.006
(0.006)

Frequent Smoker

-0.023***
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

N

431,298

913,239

481,941

National YRBS
Current Smoker

-0.036**
(0.018)

-0.022**
(0.010)

-0.012
(0.023)

Frequent Smoker

-0.025*
(0.014)

-0.010*
(0.006)

-0.008
(0.018)

N

103,837

159,216

55,318

Combined State and National YRBS
Current Smoker

-0.022***
(0.007)

-0.012*
(0.006)

0.008*
(0.004)

Frequent Smoker

-0.017***
(0.005)

-0.010**
(0.004)

0.006**
(0.003)

N

535,135

1,072,455

537,320

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age),
state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal
income), and state and year fixed effects.
CC=Carpenter and Cook (2008), HSR=Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017).
Survey weights applied when the analysis sample uses data solely from the national YRBS.
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Table 3.9 — Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking using Different Functional Forms
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.012*
(0.006)

-0.021***
(0.006)

-0.007
(0.015)

-0.033
(0.042)

-0.029
(0.085)

0.003***
(0.001)

-0.003
(0.007)

0.019
(0.032)

0.013
(0.090)

0.001
(0.001)

-0.006
(0.010)

-0.003
(0.044)

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.010)

Panel A: Youth is a current smoker
Cigarette Taxes
Cigarette Taxes2
Cigarette Taxes3
Cigarette Taxes4
Cigarette Taxes5

0.000
(0.001)

Panel B: Youth is a frequent smoker
Cigarette Taxes

-0.010**
(0.004)

Cigarette Taxes2

-0.016***
(0.005)

-0.011
(0.010)

-0.065+
(0.036)

-0.093
(0.083)

0.003***
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.005)

0.044
(0.028)

0.078
(0.088)

0.001
(0.001)

-0.014
(0.009)

-0.032
(0.041)

0.002
(0.001)

0.006
(0.009)

Cigarette Taxes3
Cigarette Taxes4
Cigarette Taxes5

Observations

-0.000
(0.001)
1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability models.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
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Table 3.10 — Estimated Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking using Different Functional Forms
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.004
(0.008)

-0.017**
(0.008)

-0.023
(0.019)

-0.038
(0.063)

-0.209
(0.144)

0.004***
(0.001)

0.006
(0.010)

0.018
(0.047)

0.213
(0.147)

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.014)

-0.103
(0.067)

0.000
(0.001)

0.023
(0.014)

Panel A: Youth is a current smoker
Cigarette Taxes
Cigarette Taxes2
Cigarette Taxes3
Cigarette Taxes4
Cigarette Taxes5

-0.002
(0.001)

Panel B: Youth is a frequent smoker
Cigarette Taxes

0.001
(0.005)

Cigarette Taxes2

-0.013***
(0.005)

-0.027*
(0.011)

-0.039
(0.037)

-0.111
(0.091)

0.003***
(0.001)

0.009
(0.006)

0.019
(0.027)

0.101
(0.093)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.008)

-0.045
(0.043)

0.000
(0.001)

0.010
(0.009)

Cigarette Taxes3
Cigarette Taxes4
Cigarette Taxes5
Observations

-0.001
(0.001)
1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

1,072,455

Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability models.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
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Table 3.11 — Youth Smoking and Cigarette Excise Taxes: Combined National and State YRBS: 2007–2013
Linear Probability Model
Youth is a current smoker
Cigarette Taxes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.015**
[0.006]

-0.012
[0.045]

-0.153
[0.128]

0.425
[0.520]

1.509
[0.870]

-0.001
[0.015]

0.136
[0.122]

-0.692
[0.751]

-2.901
[1.722]

-0.038
[0.034]

0.439
[0.426]

2.536
[1.643]

-0.096
[0.083]

-1.026
[0.747]

Cigarette Taxes2

Cigarette Taxes3

Cigarette Taxes4

Cigarette Taxes5

0.156
[0.129]

Youth is a frequent smoker
Cigarette Taxes

-0.008*
[0.004]

Cigarette Taxes2

0.010
[0.022]

-0.102
[0.078]

0.287
[0.297]

-0.645
[0.633]

-0.006
[0.007]

0.103
[0.075]

-0.454
[0.415]

1.446
[1.211]

-0.030
[0.021]

0.291
[0.234]

-1.512
[1.099]

-0.064
[0.046]

0.735
[0.475]

Cigarette Taxes3
Cigarette Taxes4
Cigarette Taxes5

Observations

-0.134
[0.078]

114,078

114,078

114,078

114,078

114,078

Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability models.
Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and
year fixed effects.
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Figure 3.1 – Teen Smoking Rates and Weighted Average Cigarette Tax Rate: National YRBS: 1993 - 2013
Notes: Teen smoking rates are imputed using the national YRBS and the weighted average cigarette tax
rates come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2014).
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Figure 3.2 – Semi-Parametric Estimates of Relationship between Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking
Notes: All figures are generated using Yatchew’s difference estimator with 7th-order differencing. All models control for individual- and
state- level covariates as well as state and year fixed effects. Taxes are converted to 2013 dollars using CPI-U. Values on the vertical axis
denote the smoothed marginal tax effects (𝑓(TL )) on youth smoking. The upper panel focuses on youth current smoking while the
bottom panel focuses on frequent smoking. Figures to the right are generate using models further include the state-specific linear time
trends. The analysis sample uses data from the combined national and state YRBS, spanning 1991–2013.
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Figure 3.3 – Average Marginal Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking
Notes: The figure plots the average marginal effects of cigarette tax on youth current smoking (upper panel) and
frequent smoking (bottom panel) using models under column 2 and 4 in Table 3.
On the right side of the panel, the average marginal effects of cigarette tax are calculated using models that further
include state-specific linear time trends.
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Figure 3.4 – Semi-Parametric Estimates of Relationship between Cigarette Prices and Youth Smoking
Notes: All figures are generated using Yatchew’s difference estimator with 7th-order differencing. All models control for individual- and statelevel covariates as well as state and year fixed effects. Tax-inclusive prices are converted to 2013 dollars using CPI-U. Values on the vertical axis
denote the smoothed marginal price effects (𝑓(TL )) on youth smoking. The upper panel focuses on youth current smoking while the bottom
panel focuses on frequent smoking. Figures to the right are generate using models further include the state-specific linear time trends. The
analysis sample uses data from the combined national and state YRBS, spanning 1991–2013.
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